Beyond Mead: Symbolic Interaction between Humans and Felines

Janet M. Alger 1
Siena College

Steven F. Alger
College of St. Rose

Recent research on the cognitive abilities and emotional capacities of animals has fueled the animal rights movement and renewed debate over the differences between human and non-human animals. This debate has not been central to sociology, although George Herbert Mead drew a very hard line between humans and animals by asserting that the latter were not capable of symbolic interaction. Sociologists are now beginning to question this assumption, and this article falls within this new line of research. We begin by presenting alternative interpretations of symbolic interaction that allow for the possibility of such activity in non-human animals. We review recent research on symbolic interaction between humans and dogs, and we present our own research findings on human-feline interaction. We conclude that there is growing evidence that symbolic interaction is widely distributed throughout the animal kingdom, and that it enables animals to survive more effectively in a wide variety of environments.


In their book analyzing the animal rights movement, Jasper and Nelkin (1992) see the movement as rooted in the breaking down of the boundaries that humans perceive between themselves and other animals. This breakdown has been taking place on two fronts. The first we might call the home front, and is part of what Jasper and Nelkin call the "tradition of sentimental anthropomorphism." That is, as industrialization and urbanization moved people off farms, they lost contact with animals except as family pets. As a result, the instrumental view of animals as "resources to be exploited for human benefit" has receded (p. 12). At the same time, people were retreating emotionally into a private life centered around the immediate family, including family pets. In this intimate emotional atmosphere, people found many similarities between themselves and their companion animals. "Partly from observation and partly from projection of their own feelings, they attributed to animals feelings such as love and affection, obedience and loyalty, trustworthiness and valor" (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992, p. 13). It was a belief in the emotional life of animals, in particular, their ability to feel pain, that supported the "animal welfare movement," the least radical branch of the animal rights crusade.

The second front where the boundaries between humans and animals were breaking down was in scientific research on animal behavior, both in laboratories and in natural settings (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992). The subjects of this research tended to be non-companion animals ranging from honeybees, bats, and birds to whales, dolphins, chimpanzees, and gorillas (Griffin, 1976; 1984; 1992; Barber, 1993). The emphasis of this research was less on the "emotions" of non-human animals than on their cognitive abilities. Scientists were discovering increasing complexities in animal behavior in such areas as food-finding, avoidance of predators, shelter construction, courtship, care of the young, navigation and communication, the explanations for which strained the traditional paradigms of behavioristic psychology or biological reductionism. Griffin, one of the leading thinkers in this area, wrote of these new complexities in animal behavior as follows:

The flexibility and appropriateness of such behavior suggest not only that complex processes occur within animal brains, but that these events may have much in common with our own mental experiences. To the extent that this line of thought proves to be valid, it will require modification of currently accepted views of scientists concerning the relationship between animal and human behavior. (1976, p. 4)


In his most recent book on cognitive ethology, the study of mental experiences in nonhuman animals, Griffin (1992) focused heavily on research dealing with communication behavior such as the use of "waggle dances" by honeybees to convey information about food sources, and the teaching of sign language to chimpanzees and gorillas. He did so because many saw the use of language as the key element separating humans from animals. Griffin concluded that the capacity for symbolic communication in animals of all kinds is much greater than previously supposed and "increasing understanding of the versatility of animal communication makes the distinction between animal communication and human language a less critical criterion of human uniqueness" (1992, p. 22). Thus, the absence of language in animals does not necessarily preclude the existence of mental experiences and consciousness. Indeed, Griffin argues that explanations of non-human animal behavior that assume "awareness," "consciousness" and "intention," are at least as compelling as those that rely on assumptions of instinct or genetic programming (Griffin, 1976; 1984; 1992). It is this kind of scientific research on the cognitive abilities of non-human animals that has supported the assumptions of the more radical branches of the animal rights crusade, those "who insist that animals have a full, conscious life to lead, so that humans cannot morally justify cutting that life short, even painlessly" (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992, p. 14).

Griffin's work has stimulated other reviews of non-human animal research, such as Barber's recent book, The Human Nature of Birds (1993). In preparing his book, Barber claims to have read "every significant scientific book and journal article that has been written about avian behavior during the past thirty years." He concludes "that not only are birds able to think simple thoughts and have simple feelings, but they also are fundamentally as aware, intelligent, mindful, emotional, and individualistic as ordinary people" (p. 165). Like Griffin, he attributes the failure of most scientists to arrive at similar conclusions to the overwhelming dominance of a "behavioristic-reductionistic- positivistic" paradigm and the fear of being accused of anthropomorphizing.

The debate over the line between humans and non-human animals has not been central to sociology, but the existence of such a line was a fundamental assumption of George Herbert Mead in setting forth the symbolic interactionist perspective (1962). In this paper, we begin by reviewing Mead's argument that language makes the intersubjectivity of symbolic interaction possible for humans but impossible for non-human animals. We present alternative theoretical interpretations of symbolic interaction by sociologists who do not treat language as a crucial prerequisite to symbolic communication. We then review Sanders' (1993) empirical research on symbolic interaction between humans and canines, in which dog owners were found to strongly perceive their relationships with their dogs to involve meaningful, empathetic interaction. We go on to present the results of our own research on cats and their caretakers, where we found that cat owners, too, see their feline companions as highly individual-minded actors who display empathy and reciprocity in their relationships with humans. We close by discussing the implications of human-animal intersubjectivity for symbolic interaction theory, the study of animal behavior, and animal rights.

Mead, Symbolic Interaction, and Animal Behavior

Symbolic interactionism is a perspective in sociology in which humans are seen as active constructors of the social world. Although norms and other external constraints exist, these do not determine what courses of action human actors will select. Rather, when actors receive a social stimulus, they evaluate it in terms of their own goals and prior experience as well as in terms of the norms. This subjective viewpoint then becomes a variable which a researcher must consider in attempting to explain how, once a stimulus occurs, actors define a situation, select a course of action, and act.

For actors to interact symbolically, before a choice is made they must be able to imagine how others perceive them and how others might react to their choice. They can imagine the meanings others will attach to alternative courses of action because they can take the role of the other and see themselves as an object seen by someone else. This intersubjectivity becomes the basis for cooperation and community as well as opposition and rebellion. Human actors always have a choice.

Mead drew a hard line between humans and other animals, asserting repeatedly throughout his work that nonhuman animals could not engage in symbolic interaction. This view is most apparent in the development of his ideas about the nature of the human self and the absence of language in animals. For instance, Mead noted:

We, of course, tend to endow our domestic animals with personality, but...we see there is no place for this sort of importation of the social process into the conduct of the individual. They do not have the mechanism for it -- language. So we say that they have no personality; they are not responsible for the social situation in which they find themselves. The human individual, on the other hand, identifies himself with that social situation. He responds to it, and although his response to it may be in the nature of criticism as well as support, it involves an acceptance of the responsibility presented by the situation. Such an acceptance does not exist in the case of lower animals. We put personalities into the animals, but they do not belong to them; and ultimately we realize that those animals have no rights. We are at liberty to cut off their lives....He has not lost anything because the future does not exist for the animal; he has not the "me" in his experience which by the response of the "I" is in some sense under his control, so that the future can exist for him. He has no conscious past since there is no self of the sort we have been describing that can be extended into the past by memories. (1962, pp. 182-3)


According to Mead, animals may communicate with each other through gestures, but there is no indication that they are aware that their own behavior has meaning for other animals. Further, they have no control over their gestures, which are instinctual manifestations. To be in control implies awareness of the consequences of one's own gestures for the response of others. Animals, then, are not engaging in symbolic interaction when they communicate through gestures because something is symbolic only if it is under one's control.

Mead, then, is laboring under the Cartesian model of animal behavior that has been largely discredited by more recent research into animal behavior, as described above. This undermining of the Cartesian paradigm calls upon sociologists to look again at the line that separates humans from other animals and to reexamine the central ideas of symbolic interactionism in the light of this new evidence. There are many elements in Mead's thought that are compatible with the new animal research if one does not focus on language as the central mechanism through which a self emerges.

Mead argued that symbolic interaction arose naturally, through the evolutionary process, to deal with situations of frustration and conflict over competing courses of habitual action. Symbolic interaction requires, in its essence, consciousness of self, internalized conversation, and evaluation of competing courses of action based on shared meanings derived from taking the role of the other. By implication, such interaction would have to involve both a memory of past interactions and projections into the future.

As we have said, for Mead, this process could not occur except through the medium of human language, which would exclude all nonhuman animals (in their natural setting) from consideration. For Mead, consciousness of self is largely a cognitive process. But other symbolic interactionists did not accept this view. Mead's colleague Cooley, for example, did not conceptualize the self in so exclusively a cognitive way. For Cooley (1964), the looking-glass self imagines its appearance to another person (a cognitive dimension, but not one that would depend on language), imagines the person's judgement of that appearance (a social dimension), and reacts emotionally to the judgement it imagines is being made (a motivational dimension). "A girl six months old will attempt in the most evident and deliberate manner to attract attention to herself, to set going by her actions some of those movements of other persons that she has appropriated. She has tasted the joy...of exerting social power, and wishes more of it" (Cooley, 1964, p. 196).

This less cognitive view of the origin of the self has been explored by other researchers who have examined the role of attachments in cognitive development (Ainsworth, Blehar, Walters & Wall, 1978) and those who have challenged the notion of young children as highly egocentric (Donaldson, 1979). Donaldson argues, in opposition to Piaget, that evidence is accumulating that even very young children have some capacity for taking the role of the other. She cites research showing that even with infants of two or three months a complex mutual understanding develops between mother and child (p. 23). Such research allows for the possibility of the emergence of a shared reality based on a strong emotional bond. Further, this less restrictive understanding of the self allows us to apply the symbolic interactionist perspective to the new research on animals and once again raise the question of whether or not animals engage in symbolic interaction.

More recently, Collins (1989), evaluating Mead' work, argues for an emotional dimension to the concept of role-taking. In particular, he posits two kinds of symbolic interaction differentiated in terms of type of goal. The first is symbolic interaction directed at practical goals. These goals are generated by our relationship to nature. They focus on problems of survival, comfort and other utilitarian problems associated with living. Collins argues that Mead dwelt almost exclusively on these types of issues in his development of symbolic interactionism. Thus symbolic interaction is conceived as instrumental to successful action under certain specifiable conditions --conditions of conflict over multiple possible courses of action (p. 12). Hence, the emphasis on the cognitive dimension of symbolic interaction.

Collins goes on to suggest that symbolic interaction is also directed at social goals to which Mead paid little attention. These goals are generated by our relationship to social groups, and they focus on symbols of solidarity. They develop out of what Collins calls "natural interaction rituals." These require at least two participants in the same location, who "focus attention on the same object or action, and are aware that each other is maintaining this focus," and "share a common mood or emotion." The mutual focus of attention and the common mood create a shared reality in which "the participants feel like members of a little group, with moral obligations to one another. Their relationship becomes symbolized by whatever they focused upon during their ritual interaction. Subsequently, when they use these symbols, they have a sense of group membership. Symbols can thus remind them to reconstitute the group assembly..." (Collins, 1989, pp. 17-18). Although Collins sees these interaction rituals as based on conversation, there does not appear to be a requirement of conversation or use of language.

These lines of development in symbolic interactionism allow us to ask important questions about the inner lives of animals and their relationship with each other and us that were not possible with Mead's formulation. For example, how likely is it that something so evolutionarily advantageous would develop in humans and not in related animals, who also face situations in which competing courses of action are presented (Griffin, 1992)? The question of whether animals have a sense of self, or a personality, needs to be raised anew. We have to ask if animals choose between competing courses of action and if so, how they make such choices. Through what mechanisms do they take the role of the other? Are emotional attachment, smell, and/or relational thinking involved? What types of symbolic interaction do animals engage in? We have to raise questions about the possibility of shared meanings and a sense of past and future. Sociologists are only just beginning to raise these questions (Sanders, 1993; Sanders & Arluke, 1993).



Sander's Study of Dogs and their Caretakers


As we have indicated, applying the perspective of symbolic interaction to animal behavior, or to interaction between humans and animals, requires a reformulation of symbolic interactionism that does not rest on Mead's requirement of the ability to use language. Sanders' (1993) study of dog owners draws on just such a reformulation originating in research on human caretakers of severely disabled people and Alzheimer patients. Both Gubrium (1986), who studied caretakers of Alzheimer patients, and Bogdan and Taylor (1989), who studied caretakers of severely disabled persons, describe a process whereby caretakers, in the absence of communication through language with their disabled partners, construct a social identity for those partners which allows them to be seen as interacting and as having a mind. For Gubrium (1986), understanding the preservation of the minds of Alzheimer patients by their caretakers requires us to move away from Mead's idea that mind is "a state of being located in and about the individual person" and to emphasize Mead's social conception of mind. "Only the treatment of mind as a social preserve, as an 'internal' entity assigned and sustained both by, and for, whomever assumes it to exist, can account for what is taken to be the minded conduct of the mindless..." (p. 38). Likewise, Bogdan and Taylor (1989) argue "that the definition of a person is to be found in the relationship between the definer and the defined, not determined either by personal characteristics or the abstract meanings attached to the group of which the person is a part" (p. 136).

In his study of dogs and their caretakers, Sanders (1993) argues that, just as caretakers of the disabled construct a "human" identity for them, so also do dog owners construct a "humanlike" identity for their pets. His study is modeled after that of Bogden and Taylor (1989), who identified four dimensions to the process of constructing humanness: "(1) attributing thinking to the other: that is, 'seeing the other as able to reason, understand and remember,' (2) seeing individuality in the other; that is, defining others as 'distinct, unique individuals with particular and specific characteristics that set them apart from others,' (3) viewing the other as reciprocating; that is, 'as giving back something important' to the relationship, and (4) defining a social place for the other; that is, as defining a part for them 'in the rituals and routines of the social unit'" (pp. 141-145). Sanders discovered that dog owners used these same "categories of evidence" to attribute mindedness to their canine companions:



The picture that emerges is of the person experiencing his or her companion dog as an authentic, reciprocating, and empathetic social actor. Canine companions are effectively involved with their caretakers in routine social exchanges premised on the mutual ability of the interactants to take the role of the other, effectively define the physical and social situation, and adjust their behavior in line with these essential determinations. (1993, p. 22)


For Sanders, it is the "emotional" connection between dog and caretaker, through Collins' (1989) "natural interaction rituals," that makes the symbolic interaction possible.



Felines and their Caretakers

The study presented here attempts to extend Sanders' findings on dog owners to cat owners. Replication of research is always necessary to increase the credibility of findings, but it is particularly important when the research is in a new area of a discipline. Sanders' findings need to be replicated across mammalian and, perhaps, even non-mammalian species by other sociologists. In this way, the discipline of sociology can add its insights into the nature of human-animal relationships to those of psychology and biology. In selecting the cat for our own attempt at replication, we were mindful of Sanders' comment that dogs have a "highly social nature" and a long history of intimate association with humans. The cat, on the other hand, may be long associated with humans but is quite differently perceived. That is, cats are often seen as aloof, independent, and indifferent to human desires and needs. Thus, to replicate Sanders' findings for cats is important in helping to establish symbolic interaction as a common attribute of animals. A second reason for choosing cats was our belief that different species manifest their capacity for symbolic interaction under different conditions and circumstances depending on the particular nature of their relationship with humans. To the extent that humans relate differently to cats than to dogs, we expected to find differences in the way symbolic interaction was revealed. Finally, our own situation as long-time multi-cat owners and our involvement with other cat owners in a local cat shelter made cats a natural research interest for us.

The data for this study comes from three sources: (1) Recorded observations of our own cats over a period of several years. (2) In-depth interviews carried out with a selected group of 20 cat owners. Because human-cat interaction varies considerably depending on the nature and composition of the household (Mertens, 1991), we deliberately chose owners who were single or married without children living at home, and who had more than one cat. We wanted households that maximized the likelihood of frequent human-cat interaction, and we felt that multi-cat households would highlight, by comparison, the distinct personalities of the cats. (3) We also drew upon first-hand accounts of cat behavior found in the magazine, Cat Fancy, from 1990 to 1995. These accounts included letters to the editors from cat owners, short articles written and submitted by cat owners, and results from surveys of reader-owners conducted by the magazine.

The Cat as Minded Actor

In our study of multi-cat households, we asked the question, "Do you think your cats think?" As in Sanders' study of dog owners, respondents overwhelmingly answered in the affirmative, though there was variation in opinion on the complexity and logic of feline thinking. One owner said, "Yes. More than just 'I'm hungry' or 'I want affection,' but I don't know how complex the thinking is. I don't like the view of a big gap between humans and animals. I fantasize about knowing what they really think. At some level every creature above the level of a shrimp has to think."

We went on to examine different dimensions of "thinking." We asked respondents if their cats ever anticipate things, hoping to discover their perception of their cats' ability to assess the future. One owner indicated that her husband, who arrives home before she does each day, told her that the cats she is closest to go to the door and wait for her shortly before her accustomed arrival. Another said that one of her cats knows when he is going to be medicated and hides. It appears to us that our own cats know when they will be taken to the veterinarian and hide before we take out the carriers we use to transport them. Since we do not take them to the veterinarian at frequent or regular intervals, this suggests a very close reading of our demeanor.

We also asked the owners if their cats ever "figured out" something they didn't expect them to grasp. We received numerous examples of such behavior. One respondent believed her cat learned on his own to ring the doorbell when he wanted to come in. Another believed her cat had figured out how to push the toilet handle down to make the water flow (and then used this device to scare another cat away from her food so he could eat it). This same cat was seen as saving the owner's life by sitting on her chest to wake her up when the furnace gave off toxic fumes. Almost all owners told of their cats' ability to open doors and cabinets by various means. Thus, problem-solving seemed to be perceived as well within their cats' mental capacity.

We believe that our own cats have figured out a variety of things but, perhaps, the most extraordinary occurrence involved our cat Casey. In good weather we took this elderly cat for a walk, always putting a collar on her. Generally, we took the collar off as soon as we returned, but on this day we forgot to do so. About an hour later, we were standing in the kitchen talking when Casey came in and placed her front paw firmly on Steve's foot. Every time Steve tried to move back she followed and kept her paw on his foot. We laughed and dropped to the floor to ask what she was doing and only then saw her collar was stuck in her mouth. We had to cut it off to free her. Casey had realized that we would be able to help and communicated her need to us.

We also asked our respondents if their cats seemed to make choices among alternatives -- to "weigh" alternatives. Such situations are seen as important in the symbolic interactionist conception of thinking because they require an internal conversation about future consequences. All of our owners were able to recount such situations. Several told of their cats as waiting to eat the food placed in front of them until they were sure they could not get the owner to give them something they liked better. As one owner described it: "Honeybun, when I first give her the food she is supposed to eat (Hills) will wait a bit to see if I will give her favorite (Fancy Feast); eventually she will eat the Hills food."

Several other respondents mentioned their cats' indecisiveness about going out in bad weather. Cats dislike cold or wet weather but there are many things they enjoy doing outdoors. When the weather was poor, owners described their cats as having difficulty deciding between their warm, dry home and their outdoor activities. One owner talked about a particularly willful cat, Chaucer, as pondering decisions such as, "Should I steal Emilia's food or is it not safe to do so?" or "Should I bite Emilia's butt, or is my owner not sufficiently distracted to make it safe to do so?" Though these animals did not have a conversation with themselves in human language, they seemed to their owners to be making mental calculations based on memory, taking on the role of the other, and assessing future consequences.

All owners were able to give examples of each of these dimensions of thinking. In sum, all saw their cats as engaging in activity that suggested taking the role of the other, defining the situation based on the information such role-taking afforded, and choosing a course of action. They also saw their cats as having strong memories of past events and an ability to consider future possibilities.

The Cat as an Individual

Like Sanders' dog owners, our cat owners saw their cats as unique individuals with distinct personalities. Owners were able to distinguish each of their cats in terms of such characteristics as temperament, demeanor, playfulness, talkativeness, and intelligence. One respondent described her blind cat Piccolina as follows:



She is enigmatic. She's the most affectionate and the most fierce. She thinks she's the number one cat in the house and she is the most likely to pick a fight. She is playful and when she plays by herself, which she does often, we imagine that she is in her own fantasy world. She is very dainty looking -- a princess. She has a loud purr and she likes to climb on guests. She grooms Rhumba [another cat in the house]. She is very loyal like a dog and follows us everywhere.

In describing their cats, our owners were particularly likely to emphasize how affectionate the cats were, how they related to the owners and to the other cats in the household, and how they reacted to visitors. Another respondent described one of her six cats in these terms: "Honeybun is the biggest love-mush. She loves everyone. She does not relate to the other cats but she cuddles with everyone who comes into the house. She demands affection and will actually 'hit' people with her paw to get them to pet her or to keep petting her."

As was the case with Sanders' dog owners, our cat owners often distinguished their cats in terms of their unique history. Many owners had cats who had been rescued, either by the owners themselves or by shelters, from situations of neglect or abuse, and this background information was used to explain such traits as fear of strangers or lack of affection. A cat's history also entered in to the owner's description in terms of how the cat had changed over time. One owner described her cat who had been rescued from a collector as "shy, but starting to become playful and trusting." A typical scenario is reflected in this excerpt from a letter to Cat Fancy: "I recently rescued a cat from the doorstep of an abandoned house. Scrawny, declawed and nearly toothless, the cat, now named Oliver, leapt into my arms. After extensive veterinary care and home treatment, Oliver has turned into a healthy, handsome and relaxed cat" (Wilbourn, 1994, p. 24).

One of our male cats, Calvin, whose original owners neglected and then abandoned him, has changed character considerably. When we first took him in he was aloof, unresponsive to our wishes (e.g., scratching on furniture), often aggressive toward us (e.g., biting us) and aggressive toward the female cats in the household. As time passed, he began to relate to us more and more -- rubbing our legs if he wanted food and crying if he wanted us to turn on the bathroom faucet so he could drink. Then, quite suddenly, he seemed to make a decision to "join" the household. His aggression subsided and he began seeking us out for affection as well as for food and drink. His behavior improved and he began using the designated scratching post instead of the furniture.


The Cat as Emotional and Reciprocating

Sanders' dog owners perceived their dogs to be "eminently emotional beings," not only in the sense of experiencing emotions such as loneliness, joy and anger, but also in the sense of being attuned to their owners' emotional states. Almost all of our respondents also perceived their cats to be empathetic, as is indicated by the following typical comments: "They have a sense of when things are not right. When we are sick or upset, they come to us and stay around us." "They sense my moods. If I am sad or crying, Cabbage comes and rubs against me." "James knows my moods. He can tell if I am upset and will climb in my lap; if I am crying he will lick my tears."

Similar sentiments were expressed by respondents to a Cat Fancy survey on how their cats showed affection. One woman wrote, "One day when I was sobbing uncontrollably because of a death in the family, Cindy jumped onto the arm of my chair and repeatedly touched me with her paw. She reached up and kissed my cheek with her nose and mouth. She stayed on the chair with her paw on my arm until I calmed down." (Diamond, 1992, pp. 40-1).

One of the dog emotions Sanders (1993) focused on was guilt. All of his owners "saw their dogs as possessing a basic sense of the rules imposed by the human members of the household" (p. 217). When the dogs violated these rules, their owners perceived them as showing guilt. This reciprocating behavior of dogs in relation to rules set by owners probably results from the fact that dogs require considerable training to be acceptable household members. We asked our respondents whether they attempted to train their cats and what rules they set for their cats, but neither loomed large as elements in their relationship to their cats. As one woman put it, "Training? No, I don't see it as a cat thing. I know you can, but one of the great things about cats is they are who they are. It's not about training. If I were going to train something, I would get a dog." Another respondent said, "No, never. Cats are free spirits. I want them to be as much of a cat as they can be." As can be seen from these typical comments, training tended to be viewed as a violation of the nature of the animal and, even though possible, not desirable. When her purebred cats began to retrieve things on their own, one owner sought assurances from the breeder that this was a natural attribute of the breed and not one that she had inadvertently stimulated.

The interaction rituals between caretakers and their cats, then, were primarily aimed at "social" goals and centered around the exchange of affection. Cat owners seemed to be the most satisfied with their relationship to a particular cat when they saw that cat as initiating the interactions between them as often as they did -- that is, as reciprocating their love and friendship.

The ability of cats to take the role of the other, therefore, cannot be primarily understood through the instrumental interactions associated with training. Instead, it is reflected in owners' descriptions of their cats' empathetic responses toward them and in their descriptions of play behavior. Consider these accounts found in Cat Fancy: "Bev Curtiss' cat, Tootsie, waits for her to hide behind the sofa. When Tootsie finds her, Bev says, 'Boo!' Then Tootsie jumps and runs to hide somewhere. Bev and Tootsie alternate hiding and seeking until the game ends with a petting session" (Commings, 1993, p. 12). "Our little Siamese cat, Koki, has a cute little trick that makes my day. She sneaks up and taps me on the arm, then runs like crazy. It is almost as if she is saying, "Tag, you're it" (Wilbourn, 1994, p. 24).

One of our owners described her cats as little thieves who steal things such as socks and then bring them back to her or her husband when they want to get a game going. Clearly, these owners see their cats as "knowing" they are playing. That seems to mean "knowing" that the other is playing also.

Affording the Cat a Social Place

Sanders found that his owners typically considered their dogs to be "authentic family members," and we found the same attitude in our cat owners. Many of our respondents were either single women or married women without children, and it is not surprising that they tended to see their cats as children. One woman described her cats as follows: "They are my children. I can't imagine my life without them. I would never give them up for anything. I have made provisions for them in my will if I should die." A sense of family-like commitment and permanence was reflected in many of the comments: "I would do anything for them. They are the most important part of my life" and "We love them and they are here to stay. I would do for them whatever they needed."

Shared family routines was another way that Sanders' dog owners provided a social place for their pets, and we found the same for our cat owners. When asked if their cats were part of any family routines, many answered that they built their family routines around the cats. Typical examples were getting up in the morning, feeding and grooming, playtimes, supervising the cats outdoors, and going to bed. One respondent described the latter routine with her six cats as follows: "At 8 P.M. they all get a treat of shaved turkey breast. At bedtime they all get "Cluckers" [another treat]. They come in the bathroom while I brush my teeth and then we all troop down the hall to the bedroom where we all sleep together."

Family routines are examples of "natural interaction rituals" in which participants are mutually aware of focusing attention on the same object or action (Collins, 1989). These objects and/or actions then become the basis for the emergence of collective representations which, in turn, can be called upon in the future to regenerate the common mood and bond that unite participants in a shared reality. In the previously quoted owner's household, the receipt of "Cluckers" and the trip to the bathroom were what created the shared reality that it was bedtime, an example of symbolic interaction directed at social goals.

As a consequence of an ongoing relationship, collective representations may also emerge in relation to a particular cat. For instance, one cat owner described a radiator that had, in the course of interaction with one of her cats, come to represent a place in which this cat expected to receive affection such that "you can do anything you want to her on this radiator."

Many such collective representations exist in relation to our own cats. When Jenny is feeling playful, she runs over to a throw rug and partially dives under it. We then get a string or her balls or toy mice and begin to play with her. Sometimes, the roles are reversed. We go over to the rug when Jenny is nearby and she runs over for a string or ball game. There is nothing about this rug that has an inherent connection with games. It does, however, have a history of being used as a prop for games with Jenny.

Thus, the rug or the radiator represent shared realities between owner and cat that have emerged in the course of interaction. They have come to have the same meaning for both parties and action could not take place unless both parties assumed the perspective of the other and defined the situation in the same way. Defining the situation is a collective process in which one's clues as to how to behave come from others. This shared reality is the basis of the perception by owners and their cats that they are a "family."

Discussion

In the foregoing paper, we have attempted to replicate Sanders' (1993) work on human-canine relationships for human-feline relationships. We have found that the cats from our multi-cat households are seen by their owners as anything but aloof. Like Sanders' dogs, they demonstrate strong cognitive skills, including the ability to define situations (both physical and social), and to select courses of action based on their assessments. In short, we have found that cats routinely engage in symbolic interaction. These characteristics of dogs and cats have been obscured for sociologists by Mead's insistence on the centrality of language for the emergence of symbolic interaction.

Like Sanders (1993) and Sanders and Arluke (1993), we have attempted to extend symbolic interaction theory to human-animal interaction. In doing so we have drawn upon the work of Cooley (1964), Donaldson (1978) and Collins (1989), all of whom allow for the possibility of the emergence of symbolic interaction through non-verbal, cognitive observational skills and emotional attachment. Such symbolic interaction takes place in the context of "natural interaction rituals" (Collins, 1989). These rituals give rise to collective representations which can be called upon in the future by the parties involved to re-evoke the solidarity of the human-animal group. As with human-human interaction, these groups tend to be primary groups such as families which, as we noted earlier, provided one of the settings historically associated with the breakdown of the species barrier.

We have further found that the mindedness of cats, as revealed by their owners, encompasses both the practical and social goals of symbolic interaction. Practical goals may involve a fairly "literal" seeing of things from another perspective and/or they may depend more directly upon an understanding of the intent and emotions of another. When our cats are looking out of the living room window and they hear a potentially interesting sound from our neighbor's yard but cannot see the source of the sound because of the fence, they run upstairs to the bedroom window from which they can see over the fence. Here they illustrate a literal perception of an alternative perspective to achieve the goal of seeing the source of the sound. In the example given earlier of Honeybun waiting to eat the Hills brand food until she is sure she can't get the owner to provide Fancy Feast, the cat is attempting to assess the intent of the owner in the hope of receiving a more desirable meal.

Symbolic interaction directed at social goals always involves an understanding of the intent and emotions of a role partner. Cats' behavior in our study was strongly directed toward social goals. They sought out their owners for affection and play and engaged in greeting rituals upon arising in the morning and when their owners arrived home from work in the evening.

Thus the evidence of our study, as well as the studies of others, strongly suggests that far from being a human attribute, symbolic interaction is a widely distributed ability throughout the animal kingdom enabling animals to survive more effectively in a large variety of environments. Even male guppies observe the performance of other males to see which ones females prefer and which they avoid. If given a choice, the observing male will then swim near the rejected males, presumably so that he will appear a more attractive alternative to the females (Dugatkin & Sargent, 1994). As Sanders and Arluke (1993) argue, "it would seem that a reasoned analysis of animal-human social exchanges would acknowledge that mutuality based on the animal's self awareness and ability to...empathetically experience the perspective of coactors is worth considering. The explanatory value of these factors is at least as powerful as causal accounts solely premised on behaviorist or instinctivist presumptions" (p. 382).

These studies of animal mindedness raise important questions for sociologists in terms of both research and advocacy. If animals are capable of symbolic interaction, there is no reason that sociology as a discipline cannot take up questions of animal behavior focusing not only on the many forms of human-animal interaction that exist in societies but also on animal-animal interaction. Thus, such findings potentially break down some traditional boundaries among the sociology, psychology, and biology.

Sociology as a discipline was founded in advocacy and has a long tradition of research whose goal has been to assist in the breakdown of barriers of race, sex, and social class. These studies call upon sociology to once again turn its attention to the issue of injustice and inequality and assist in the provision of the knowledge base that will undermine speciesism. As Barber noted, following Berry:



For this radical change to occur, people have to see themselves as they truly are--one species among many in a larger community of life. They have to experience a 'reenchantment' with their kin in the earth community, reestablish themselves within a natural context, and integrate their well-being with the well-being of the natural world. Only within the ever-renewing recycling processes of nature is there a healthy future for the human community. (Barber, 1993, p. 157)


Note
1. Correspondence should be directed to Janet M. Alger, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, NY, 12211-1462, 518-783-2345, email: Alger@Siena.Edu.


References

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Barber, T. X. (1993). The human nature of birds: A scientific discovery with startling implications. New York: St. Martin's.

Bogdan, R. & Taylor, S. J. (1989). Relationships with severely disabled people: The social construction of humanness. Social Problems, 36, 135-148.

Collins, R. (1989). Toward a neo-Meadian sociology of mind. Symbolic Interaction, 12, 1-32.

Cooley, C. H. (1964). Human nature and the social order. New York: Schocken Books.

Diamond, B. L. (1992). Purrs and kisses: How do cats love their owners? Our readers tell the ways. Cat Fancy, 35, 40-47.

Donaldson, M. (1979). Children's minds. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

Dugatkin, L. A. & Sargent, R. C. (1994). Male-male association patterns and female proximity in the guppy, poecilia reticulata. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 35, 141-145.

Griffin, D. R. (1976). The question of animal awareness: Evolutionary continuity of mental experience. New York: Rockefeller University.

Griffin, D. R. (1984). Animal thinking. Cambridge: Harvard University.

Griffin, D. R. (1992). Animal minds. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Gubrium, J. F. (1986). The social preservation of mind: The Alzheimer's disease experience. Symbolic Interaction, 9, 37-51.

Jasper, J. M. & Nelkin, D. (1992). The animal rights crusade: The growth of a moral protest. New York: Free Press.

Mertens, C. (1991). Human-cat interactions in the home setting. Anthrozoös, 4, 214-231.

Mead, G. H. (1962). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Sanders, C. R. (1993). Understanding dogs: Caretakers' attributes of mindedness in canine-human relationships. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 22, 205-226.

Sanders, C. & Arluke, A. (1993). If lions could speak: Investigating the animal-human relationship and the perspectives of nonhuman others. Sociological Quarterly, 34, 377-390.

Wilbourn, C. (1994). Cats on the couch: The best solution. Cat Fancy, 37, 24-25.
 

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