Reviewed by: Deborah E. Moore
Clark University

Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Susan McCarthy

When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals

New York: Delacorte, 1995. xxiii, 291 pp. $23.95.

What Masson and McCarthy have done in this work is to compile information from many scientific studies, observations, and anecdotes to achieve what is certainly the most comprehensive look at emotions in nonhuman animals undertaken in this century. While one might expect secondary information to lack originality, this is a compelling work; the authors retrieve many interesting primary studies and observations from obscurity--a forceful accumulation of evidence that nonhumans possess the capacity for emotions as real and at least as intense as those of humans.

The authors have presented their broadly researched, accessible, and generally well-written information convincingly, offering numerous credible examples to supplement their theories which are based on the premise that "animals of all kinds lead complex emotional lives" (p. xxii). The first two chapters adeptly deal with the philosophical and historical bases for the arguments discussed. Each of the following chapters focuses on various related emotions and behaviors. An unusual notation system is annoying.

Throughout the volume, the authors take to task the classic convictions and accompanying behaviors of the scientific establishment toward animals and their feelings. In fact, they succeed not only in showing that official "scientific" denial of the depth and breadth of animal emotions is self-serving and misguided, but that individual scientists, behind their professional facades, are often able to appreciate, yet will not publicly admit, their subjects' sensibilities, for fear of reprisals or ridicule from the scientific community. It seems that the zeitgeist might now be right for this bold new assertiveness. In recent years there has been a surge of related writings in the scientific literature that has set the stage for this book: Griffin's books on cognitive ethology (1981, 1984, 1992), and Davis and Balfour's book on the scientist-animal relationship (1992) are just a few that come to mind.

In exploring the culture of Western science, the book makes the telling point that novel animal behaviors and events, both individual and social, are usually omitted in scientific studies, which do not allow for such observations. Furthermore, this culture of science is invested in not noticing. Anecdotal evidence is commonly disparaged in the hard-core scientific community and often ignored. This kind of conscious ignorance cannot reflect good science.

The section on anthropomorphism offers a cogent analysis of the arguments. It is here that official science's Achilles' heel is exposed and prodded. Masson and McCarthy identify anthropocentrism itself as the "real problem underlying many of the criticisms of anthropomorphism":

Placing humans at the center of all interpretation, observation, and concern, and dominant men at the center of that, has led to some of the worst errors in science....The notion that animals are wholly other from humans, despite our common ancestry, is more irrational than the notion that they are like us. (p. 41)

In their enthusiasm for suggesting why animals might exhibit novel or normal behaviors that seem to show clear emotional involvement, the authors sometimes theorize using rather liberal interpretations: "Animals seek each other out more than biologists once assumed, perhaps in an effort to avoid feelings of sadness, loneliness, and sorrow" (p. 97). They also occasionally make sweeping statements: "If feelings can cross cultures, it seems likely they can cross species" (p. 11). These statements present a potentially dangerous vulnerability in an otherwise convincing argument; they leave the authors open to accusations that their reasoning is weak, if not fantastic, romantic, or silly. The authors also tread on thin ice when they ask rhetorical questions such as, "Why should the fox not feel the mischievousness that has been imputed to the species over the centuries?" (p. 128). This type of negative questioning is used many times, giving the benefit of the doubt to animal emotions and putting the burden of proof on those that doubt. The technique often works well, as in the statement, "Is there any reason to suppose that this species of animal does not feel this emotion?" (p. 225), but it can be risky. Although most readers will see this rhetorical technique for what it is--using plausible suppositions that can stretch the mind to possible realities--the authors would have done better to have used it more cautiously and conservatively.

At the same time, using animal emotions as theoretical motivational factors, Masson and McCarthy offer interesting theories to explain some puzzling behaviors, such as surplus killing. In this case, the authors suggest that animals may enjoy the killing "because they are using their abilities to the fullest, exercising their capacities; they display funktionslust , delight in their powers" (p. 147). They also frequently point out that an instance of a particular animal behavior, such as lack of compassion, does not rule out or invalidate different behavior in other circumstances. As with humans, there are individual differences as well as idiosyncratic conditions that can account for inconsistencies in behaviors across a species.

The book does not include many references to scientific study of pain and other sensations that indicate physiological evidence of sensibilities in animals. More reference to this literature might make the argument more palatable to hard-core scientists who deny the importance or even existence of animal feelings.

This is a bold and iconoclastic book, attacking long-held and strongly-defended scientific doctrine. It is single-minded and clear, and takes on this potential quagmire of an argument commendably. The interviews by McCarthy yielded important, effective information. Many quotations and anecdotes come from notable authorities on animal behavior such as Goodall and de Waal. Implicit and explicit throughout are reminders that to acknowledge feelings in all animals is to recognize the need for greatly increased ethical consideration of nonhumans. This book provides an almost utopian vision of human-animal relations that will probably never be realized, but nevertheless should be considered. How unfortunate that a book like this needed to be written at this stage of our civilization and scientific knowledge. This book may become a primary source for the animal rights movement.

References

Davis, H., & Balfour, D. The inevitable bond: Examining scientist-animal interactions . New York: Cambridge University, 1992.

Griffin, D. (1981). The question of animal awareness: Evolutionary continuity of mental experience . New York: Rockefeller University, 1981.

Griffin, D. (1984). Animal thinking . Cambridge: Harvard University, 1984.

Griffin, D. (1982). Animal minds . Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992

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