Us and Them: Scientists' and Animal Rights Campaigners' Views of the Animal Experimentation Debate

Elizabeth S. Paul 1
University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Animal rights campaigners and scientists working with animals completed anonymous questionnaires in which they were asked to report, not only on their own beliefs and ideas about the animal experimentation debate, but also on those they perceived the opposing group to hold. Both groups of participants tended to have a negative and somewhat extreme view of the other. But they did have an accurate grasp of the arguments and defenses commonly offered on both sides of the debate, and showed some agreement concerning the relative capacity of different animals to suffer. Differences appeared in the level of the phylogenetic hierarchy at which participants thought animals might be capable of suffering, and in their decision-making processes regarding the admissibility of animal experiments.

Recent years have witnessed an unprecedented increase in public debate concerning the issue of animal experimentation (Gluck and Kubacki, 1991). Although individuals have voiced concerns about experiments conducted on animals for many centuries (Thomas, 1983; Maehle and Trohler, 1987; Serpell, 1993), modern animal rights campaigners appear to have been highly successful in revitalizing the anti-vivisection movement to a level of activity not witnessed since Victorian times (Hampson, 1987). In Britain, the government has responded by introducing tighter laws controlling the use and care of experimental animals, and the total number of animals used in research is steadily decreasing (Hampson, 1987; personal communication, Home Office). The public at large also appears to have been influenced by the modern animal rights movement. A recent poll ("Attitudes to Diet and Health," 1989) in Britain found that 50% of respondents said they thought scientific experiments on animals were morally wrong. This compared with 22% of the same sample believing capital punishment was morally wrong and 35% opposing abortion (Jacobs and Worcester, 1990).

In the present article, my aim is to offer some preliminary insights into the psychology of attitudes towards animal experimentation. To date, work carried out in this area has tended to focus on the attitudes of broad groups of people (especially students), using structured, closed-ended questionnaires and attitude scales (e.g., Bowd and Boylan, 1986; Gallup and Beckstead, 1988; Bowd and Bowd, 1989; Furnham and Pinder, 1990; Driscoll, 1992; Broida, Tingley, Kimball and Miele, 1993; Furnham and Heyes, 1993). These studies have offered information, in particular, on the sorts of factors that might predispose individuals toward more or less favorable attitudes towards the use of animals in experiments. For example, women are repeatedly found to be more concerned about the morality of animal experimentation, and other animal welfare issues, than are men (Gallup and Beckstead, 1988; Driscoll, 1992; Broida et al., 1993; Furnham and Heyes, 1993; Herzog, Bethart and Pittman, 1991), and young people appear to be more concerned than older age groups (Furnham and Pinder, 1990; Driscoll, 1992). People who hold views on the left of the political spectrum tend to be more concerned about animal use than those on the right (Furnham and Pinder, 1990; Broida et al., 1993; Furnham and Heyes, 1993). And while religiosity per se has not been found to be related to attitudes to animal experimentation (Furnham and Pinder, 1990; Driscoll, 1992), fundamentalist and conservative Christian groups do seem to be more approving of animal use than are more liberal Christians (Bowd and Bowd, 1989; Furnham and Pinder, 1990; Driscoll, 1992; Broida et al., 1993). Students trained in biology tend to hold more favorable attitudes toward animal use, and appear to be more confident in the resultant benefits of biomedical research, than those who have little or no science education (Bowd and Boylan, 1986; Gallup and Beckstead, 1988). Interestingly, however, Furnham and Pinder (1990) found that general level of education was associated with more negative views of animal experimentation rather than more positive ones. Finally, pet owners, people who have grown up with pets, and self-described cat and dog lovers are also likely to have greater concerns about animal experimentation (Furnham and Pinder, 1990; Driscoll, 1992; Furnham and Heyes, 1993; Paul and Serpell, 1993), perhaps because they regard non-human animals as more person-like than do those who have not experienced close, affectionate relationships with animals.

However, these studies tell us little about the beliefs and feelings of people directly involved in the animal experimentation debate: anti-experimentation campaigners and the scientists who use animals as part of their work. Politicians, for example, often have very different beliefs than those of their general public supporters (e.g., Tetlock, 1984). Both scientists and animal rights campaigners have strong feelings about animal experimentation; they have probably thought long and hard about the issues involved, yet they have arrived at opposing conclusions.

Herzog (1993) interviewed 23 animal rights activists using open-ended questions focusing on the emotional aspects of their involvement with the movement, and the effects it had on their lives. Similar to the findings of a survey by Plous (1991), Herzog found that these animal rights campaigners represented a broad spectrum of attitudes and behavior. Some reported being virtually obsessed by animal rights issues, thinking about animal suffering almost every minute of every day, while others kept their beliefs under strict control, not letting them dominate their lives. For some, "conversion" to the animal rights way of thinking was a highly emotional commitment, but for others it was a carefully considered and clearly thought out intellectual and philosophical standpoint. Despite the literature on both sides of the animal experimentation debate often tending towards the absolutist and polemical, the animal activists interviewed by Herzog admitted that there were many areas of moral ambiguity in their view of humans' relations with animals. These moral gray areas included the keeping of pets, the taking of medicines that had been tested on animals, and the killing of pest animals. Another realm where there was a clear disagreement between popular stereotypes of animal rights campaigners and the activists interviewed by Herzog concerned their opinions about extremist attacks and violence in the name of animal liberation. All but two of the interviewees eschewed any violence of this kind. Although it would be difficult to obtain a sample of extremist animal rights activists to take part in a psychological study, it seems likely that their motivations and attitudes would be very different from those of rank and file members of the animal rights movement.

Two American researchers have recently made "participant observation" studies of laboratory science culture. Arluke (1988) found that laboratory animal researchers and technicians frequently "objectify" their subject animals, avoiding prolonged or intimate contact with them, giving them numbers rather than names, and using euphemisms both for the animals themselves and for some of the procedures carried out on them. This objectification might help to explain the findings of Phillips (1993), that postoperative analgesics were rarely used in the American laboratories she studied. The popular stereotype of animal research workers as uncompromisingly hard-hearted and unempathetic was not, however, supported by Arluke's work. He found that even where objectification was commonplace, individual animals (perhaps those with special or distinguishing features or behavior patterns) were picked out to be laboratory pets. Affection was lavished on them and they were saved from "sacrifice" at the end of the experiment (or not experimented upon at all). Rules forbidding pet keeping in laboratories and the taking home of post-experimental animals were regularly broken, often with great clandestine effort and ingenuity on the part of the researchers. And the more time researchers and technicians had to spend in direct contact with their animals, the more likely they were to develop feelings of affection and admiration toward them, even if they accepted that these animals would have to be killed at the end of the experiment (Arluke, 1988; 1990).

It is clear from the studies described above that neither animal researchers nor animal rights activists are the uni-dimensional ogres that they are frequently portrayed to be by the literature of opposing factions. The aim of the present study is to find out more about how both these groups of people see themselves, the issue of animal experimentation, and the people with whom they disagree so passionately. By asking participants to give their information privately and anonymously to a neutral but sympathetic investigator, it is hoped that a more personal and accurate picture of their beliefs and feelings emerges. The methods used in this study were predominantly qualitative rather than quantitative. Structured questionnaires were used, but they posed open-ended questions, giving space for lengthy free responses. Such a technique enables rich and detailed information to be gained from relatively small numbers of participants, unconstrained by the preconceived hypotheses and ideas of the investigator. This approach is especially appropriate for early studies of a new attitude domain, where clear theories and testable hypotheses are unavailable or premature. Herzog (1993) and Arluke (1988; 1990) have clearly demonstrated the value of such qualitative studies in this area of research.

Method

Procedure and Participants

Two groups of participants completed very similar questionnaires. The first group was made up of members of animal rights clubs and societies based in Cambridge, England. Approximately 50 questionnaires were circulated to these people by a contact who was an active member of all four of the societies approached. The criteria for participation were: "anyone who is involved in campaigning for animal rights, and who has strong concerns about the morality of animal experimentation, and about the welfare of animals that are used in experiments." Participants were asked to complete the questionnaires as soon as possible, and return them to the author in the pre-paid envelope provided. Twenty-two completed questionnaires were returned.

The second group were all members of the Research Defence Society (RDS), a nationwide body of scientists involved in some way with animal research. The aim of the society is to defend animal research and promote understanding of the benefits it yields. It was founded in 1908 in direct response to the perceived threat to science posed by anti-vivisection campaigners of the time. Given the nature of this organization, it must be borne in mind that the attitudes of this group of respondents are not necessarily representative of animal researchers in general. They probably feel particularly strongly about the animal experimentation issue, and may well have a better knowledge of animal rights philosophy than many of their colleagues. The questionnaires were circulated to RDS members in the following manner. First, the Executive Director of the RDS wrote to 54 randomly selected members, asking them whether they would be willing to take part in the study, and offering them the opportunity to opt out. Nine people replied, indicating that they would prefer not to take part, and questionnaires were circulated to the remaining 45. The stated criteria for participation were: "anyone who undertakes any kinds of experiments using animals as part of their work." Twenty-two questionnaires were completed and returned in the pre-paid envelopes provided.

Questionnaires

The questionnaires predominantly made use of open-ended, free response questions, with plenty of space provided for written answers. A different questionnaire was used for each group of participants, although the majority of questions were identical in format. They were simply worded in such a way as to pertain to the appropriate group. All questionnaires were answered anonymously.

Data obtained from the questionnaires can be broken down into background information and beliefs about animal experimentation. Participants were asked to give their age, sex and occupation. They were also asked if they currently refrained from eating any animal food products for moral or ethical reasons. In the main part of the questionnaire, participants were asked a series of open-ended, free-response questions designed to obtain a detailed picture of their attitudes towards animal experimentation and their views about their own and the opposing group's motives and ideas surrounding the animal experimentation issue as a whole. Four of these questions will be discussed in this paper.

1. Beliefs concerning the animal experiments that should and should not be allowed to take place. Questions were the same for both groups of participants. They were asked to list briefly, in two separate sections, the types of animal experiments that "should (and) should not be allowed to take place."

2. Where to draw the line between species that do and do not suffer. Again, this question was the same for both groups of participants: "Different people have very different ideas about where to 'draw the line' between species that they believe are able to think and feel, and therefore have the potential to suffer in some way, and those they believe do not. Obviously it is very difficult for most people to draw a clear 'line' between one species and another, but where, roughly, do you think this line should be drawn? (please give your reasons if possible)"

3. Ideas and arguments for supporting and opposing animal experimentation. Participants were asked to imagine that they had met someone with a view of animal experimentation that opposed their own. First, they were asked to "List briefly, in order of their importance to you, the sorts of points/ ideas that you would make use of to argue for/defend your own viewpoint." They were then asked to list briefly "the points/ideas (a person with the opposing opinion) might use to argue for/defend their own viewpoint." The precise wording of the questions was tailored to be appropriate to the group being questioned.

4. Beliefs about the origins of the participant's own and the opposing group's view of animal experimentation. These questions were again tailored to apply specifically to the group being questioned. For example, animal rights campaigners were first asked "What do you think it is about you (e.g., your personality, your upbringing and your life experiences) that has made you and enables you to be the sort of person who is involved with the animal rights movement? (Even if you're not sure, please try to guess)." They were then asked the same question about "people who undertake animal experiments."

Analysis and Presentation of Results

Because the sample sizes for each group were the same (n=22), all frequency data have been presented as whole numbers, rather than as percentages. Where appropriate, simple non-parametric statistics have been used to analyze differences between groups. The majority of the data were, however, qualitative in nature, and have been subjected to content analysis. Content analysis has been defined as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Holsti, 1969). Many different forms of content analysis are used by psychologists and sociologists, but two basic types have been employed here. The first is a statement-based form in which responses are broadly classified according to the themes they convey. The frequency of occurrence of commonly occurring themes can then be compared between groups. The second form of content analysis is based on a word count system in which the frequency of occurrence of particular words or simple phrases are recorded. Rates of occurrence between groups of subjects can then be compared and analyzed.

Results and Discussion

Description of Participants

There were 22 respondents from each of the two groups surveyed. Men and women were similarly represented among the animal rights campaigners (10 men, 12 women), but not among the animal researchers (21 men, 1 woman). The animal rights campaigners (average age 29.2 years; range 17-72 years) were, in general, younger than the scientists (average age 48.9 years; range 31-63 years). The animal researchers were all academics (researchers, lecturers or professors), while the animal rights campaigners came from a wide range of occupational backgrounds, including a cleaner, a social worker, a truck driver, an architect and a research scientist. The majority of the animal rights campaigners, however, were students (n=12).

Twelve of the animal rights campaigners reported following a vegan diet, while the remaining 10 were vegetarians. Although none of the animal researchers were vegans or vegetarians, seven of them did report some kind of ethical food avoidance (e.g., not eating veal or factory-farmed meat).

Beliefs Concerning the Sorts of Animal Experiments That Should and Should Not be Allowed

When asked what types of experiments on animals should be allowed to take place, approximately half of the participants in each group took a fairly absolute, all-or-none position (see Table 1). However, animal researchers (but not animal rights campaigners) showed a strong tendency to soften such bold statements with provisos regarding, for example, maintaining legality or minimizing suffering. Likewise, when asked what types of experiments should not be allowed, only two of the researchers said none (i.e., all should be allowed), while nine of the animal rights campaigners said all (i.e., none should be allowed).

Table 1

For those on both sides who made more moderate or modified statements about the admissibility of animal experiments, it is interesting to note that different criteria seem to be utmost in their minds. Many animal rights campaigners appeared to use animal suffering as their main judgement criterion. But most of the animal researchers focused primarily on the value and outcome of research as the principle criterion for judging admissibility (especially in their answers concerning experiments that should be allowed). This latter finding seems to parallel that of Staffleau (1994), who found that animal discomfort and human interest were not evenly weighted when ethical judgements about animal experiments were made by the scientists he studied. For example, in one survey he found that while variation in the projected human interest (or value) of a hypothetical animal experiment explained 31% of the variation in acceptability scores (as rated by animal researchers), variation in animal discomfort explained only 5% of the acceptability score variation. So, it can be speculated that animal researchers and animal rights campaigners are going through very different decision-making processes when considering the admissibility of animal experiments. The former may be employing human interest or research outcome as their primary criterion, with animal suffering as a secondary consideration if human interest is low. The latter are perhaps operating by a similar process in the opposite direction.

Where to "Draw the Line" Between Species Which Can and Cannot Suffer

At first sight, both groups gave very similar answers to this question. Half of the animal researchers (n=11) and a similar number of animal rights campaigners (n=9) insisted that they could not draw any kind of line, while ten animal rights campaigners and four animal researchers did make an attempt to locate some sort of cut-off point for animals' capacity to suffer. Whether or not they could draw a line, however, a large number of respondents in both groups expressed some idea of there being a phylogenetic hierarchy in ability to suffer, with higher animals (e.g., primates, mammals in general) being given greater concern than lower ones (e.g., insects, worms) (animal rights campaigners n=13, animal researchers n=9).

In order to obtain a clearer idea of the general level at which each group was placing the "line" between suffering and non-suffering species, a word-based content analysis technique was used. Whether they were actually attempting to "draw a line," or simply mentioning the idea of a phylogenetic hierarchy of capacity to suffer, most participants listed a number of species in their deliberations. This process usually took the form of identifying species which were both above and below some notional line or gray area of sentience. For example, an animal rights campaigner wrote "Mammals and lizards do suffer, I think. Most insects probably don't, but I am willing to give them the benefit of the doubt," while an animal researcher contributed "I don't believe in a 'line.' Surely it is a gradual change from ants to amphibia to rats to higher mammals. Personally, I don't mind killing rats, I'm less happy about rabbits, and I wouldn't work with apes." A few participants only mentioned species that were either above or below the line. For example, "I think higher vertebrates and especially primates need special attention" (animal researcher) and "I suppose prawns and ants don't think very much" (animal rights campaigner). However, there were no major differences between the two groups in the proportions of such responses . By categorizing the species listed by such participants (i.e., into primates, other mammals, other vertebrates, etc.), therefore, and counting the number of species in each category that were mentioned by participants in each group, a rough idea of the point in the hierarchy where attention was being focused could be gleaned.

Table 2

The notion of some sort of phylogenetic hierarchy in the mental capacity of animals (and thus, presumably, in ability to suffer) long predates the development of evolutionary theory and human knowledge of the similarities and differences between human and non-human nervous systems (Thomas, 1983; Maehle, 1994). Indeed, the fact that very young children will spontaneously talk to "higher" animals, but only talk about "lower" ones, such as invertebrates, suggests that human beings may hold a deep-rooted sense of their greater and lesser connectedness with different species (Nielson and Delude, 1989). So, although the animal rights philosopher Singer (1975) appears to reject "speciesism" in principle, many of the animal rights campaigners who participated in this study did, in fact, perceive important differences between "higher" and "lower" animals in their ability to suffer.

Nevertheless, it can be seen clearly from Table 2 that the animal researchers were focusing their attention and concern somewhat higher up the phylogenetic scale than were the animal rights campaigners. Although the two groups did not differ qualitatively in their assessments of the factors by which suffering is likely to be determined (i.e., phylogenetic advancement), they did appear to differ in their quantitative assessment of where appreciable capacity for suffering might begin and end.

Cultural influences are clearly very important in determining how people judge the sentience and mental capacity of other species (e.g., Maehle, 1994; Ritvo, 1994). Religion, philosophy, and political and economic circumstances all seem to have had influences on people's views of animals in the past (Thomas, 1983). But personality and, in particular, tendency or ability to empathize with others might also lead to individual differences in assessments of the mental abilities of non-human animals. In this case, the "cultures" of science on one hand and animal rights activism on the other have played their parts in determining the attitudes measured here. But the mechanisms by which such cultural influences are exerted, and the additional role played by personality factors (e.g., liberalism, tendency to empathize) remain open questions for the future.

Ideas and Arguments for Supporting and Opposing Animal Experimentation

Participants were asked to list ideas or arguments in support of their own position (for or against animal experimentation), and ideas that they believed people opposing them might give. Thus, both groups yielded information concerning their beliefs about the arguments both for and against the use of animals in experiments. Thematic content analysis revealed ten ideas opposing and eleven ideas supporting experimentation which were put forward by two or more participants from either group.

In the tables below, the number of participants putting forward each argument are indicated (R= animal rights campaigners, S= animal researchers). Differences in the number of participants from the two groups who put forward each argument were analyzed using the Chi-square statistic, and probability levels have been shown where significant.

Table 3

Although individual subjects on neither side demonstrated a complete understanding of the other side's position, both groups appeared to have a similar profile of knowledge concerning the arguments for and against animal experimentation. Such findings do not support the once popular notion that pro-attitude information is selectively learned at the expense of anti-attitude information (Greaves, 1972; Pratkanis, 1989). In fact, the "bipolar schema" hypothesis of attitude representation (Judd and Kulik, 1980) seems to be more in keeping with the findings reported here. This is the idea that people store their attitude memories predominantly in terms of very agreeable and very disagreeable points of view, regardless of which side they actually support (Pratkanis, 1989). Hymes (1986) found that for abortion attitudes, these kinds of bipolar schemata were more common in ardent pro- and anti-abortionists than among people with a neutral point of view. So the appearance of such a schema in the participants of the present study is consistent with the possibility that bipolar representations are particularly representative of strongly held attitude positions.

But there were certain arguments that tended to be put forward significantly more often by one side than the other. Animal rights campaigners were significantly more likely to say that arguments in favor of animal experimentation included "humans are more important than animals" and "animals don't really suffer much" (Chi square=24.07, p<.001; Chi-square=5.50, p<.05). Perhaps these are implicit assumptions of the pro- experimentation position, but ones which the animal researchers do not regard as effective or useful "arguments" for their beliefs. Or perhaps animal rights campaigners are simply mistaken in attributing such opinions to people who support animal experiments. Future research, presenting each group with the ideas of the other, will be needed to establish the reasons for this difference.

The fact that animal researchers were significantly more likely to say that animal experiments are no morally worse than meat production highlights an interesting phenomenon in the animal rights debate (Chi- square=4.25, p<.05). There is clearly a discrepancy between public concern about animal experiments (50% opposed in a recent British poll - Jacobs and Worcester, 1990) and public tolerance of meat production (only 3-4% vegetarianism - "Attitudes to Diet and Health," 1989; Gallup, 1990). Although the animal rights campaigners do, in fact, appear to be similarly concerned about farm and laboratory animals (they were all vegetarians or vegans), the animal researchers are evidently expressing a feeling that they are being picked out unfairly for criticism by the public at large (see also Herzog, 1988; Gluck and Kubacki, 1991 for other examples of such inconsistencies).

Animal rights campaigners were more likely to put forward the anti-experimentation argument that experiments are often unnecessary or useless (Chi-square=4.25, p<.05). This is surprising, given that a number of the scientists mentioned unnecessary and useless experiments in the previous section concerning the types of experiments they believed should and should not be allowed. It seems likely, therefore, that the present difference simply reflects the fact that in this section, animal researchers are tending to offer arguments for and against their own experiments, rather than animal experiments in general.

Beliefs about the Subjects' Own and the Opposing Groups' Views of Animal Experimentation

Both groups of subjects were asked to report what they thought it was about themselves (e.g., their personality, their upbringing, and their life experiences) that made them (or enabled them to) hold their views concerning animal experimentation. They were also asked to answer the same question concerning the opposing group.

Although each group presented a similar number of ideas about the origins of their own attitudes (mean number of ideas: animal rights campaigners, 2.23, animal researchers, 2.36, Mann-Whitney U=208.0, non-sig.), animal researchers offered a greater number of ideas concerning the origins of the opposing group's views than they did about their own (mean number of ideas: 3.18, Wilcoxon z=-2.15, 2 tailed p<.05). Animal rights campaigners, however, did not put forward significantly more ideas about the origins of animal researchers attitudes than they did about their own (mean number of ideas: 2.41, Wilcoxon z=-0.72, non-sig.).

The themes which emerged as a result of content analysis of the responses are presented below. All themes which were mentioned by two or more participants are listed.

Table 4

Research into stereotyping has suggested that people tend to have a more complex representation of their own group than of other groups, and that this lack of complexity can lead to more extreme judgments being made about out-group than in-group members (e.g., see Linville, 1982). Given this, it would not be surprising if a similar pattern emerged here between animal rights campaigners and animal researchers.

In fact, although their opinions frequently appear extreme, both groups offered a greater number of ideas about the psychology and motivation of the opposing group than they did about their own (although this was only significant for the animal researchers). Perhaps then, if one holds one's own beliefs and attitudes to be true and correct, there is little need to justify them in terms of personality or life experiences. But the corollary of this is that other people's false or incorrect beliefs must be explained away, presumably by focusing on why or how they have come to make such judgmental mistakes.

To note several more details in the actual content of participants' remarks, especially about themselves. Animal rights campaigners tended to use self-focused personality and life experience explanations for their attitudes, while the animal researchers tended to focus away from themselves, on the science and its importance, interests and humaneness. This suggests that strongly pro- and anti-experimentation attitudes may have very different functions for the groups of people who hold them. The animal rights campaigners' views appear to be predominantly "value expressive" and "social adjustive" (e.g., see Snyder and DeBono, 1989), in that they serve to allow them to express publicly what they believe to be their true identity and allegiance to their chosen social groups. The animal researchers, on the other hand, seem to hold their beliefs as direct extensions of their work, not of the self, and as such their views are perhaps fulfilling "knowledge" or even "ego defensive" functions (Snyder and DeBono, 1989). That is, their attitudes concerning, in particular, the humaneness and medical usefulness of animal experiments, enable them to continue in work which, for most, was not regarded as particularly controversial when they started their careers.

Interestingly, both groups offered the idea that experiences of animals during childhood had affected their attitudes toward the use of animals. But animal rights campaigners particularly cited experience with pets, while animal researchers tended to pick out farms and farm animals as their important influence. Historically, the movement away from farming toward modern urban life with pets has paralleled rising concern about animal welfare and animal rights in the Western world (Thomas, 1983; Serpell and Paul, 1994). Indeed, the notion that farming and pet keeping might give rise to fundamentally different views of animals has recently received some empirical support (Paul and Serpell, 1993; Hills, 1993). In the future it will be of interest to ask, therefore, how exactly these experiences differ, and in what ways they affect people's subsequent views.

Conclusions

Although the two groups studied here had a clear knowledge of the arguments and ideas on both sides of the animal experimentation debate, they maintained a stance of rigid disagreement. Yet on further inspection, there were a number of surprising similarities between the views of the opposing factions. Both were agreed on the existence of a phylogenetic hierarchy in animals' capacity to suffer - although they drew their "lines" in slightly different positions within that hierarchy. At least half the participants from each group made some concessions to the other's position by highlighting possible instances when animal experimentation may (on the part of animal rights campaigners) or may not (animal researchers) be admissible. So, neither were quite as absolute in their stance as the opposing group might have us believe. Indeed, even the fact that both factions tended to have somewhat extreme views of the others' motivations can be seen as a similarity between them. When disagreeing with a nebulous other, it is perhaps helpful and supportive to one's own argument to perceive the counter argument as extreme to the point of ridicule. Moderation, in fact, may be disarming. As a result, both sides seem content to maintain moderate views of themselves and somewhat extreme views of the opposition.

There were also some important differences between the two groups. In particular, the scientists generally regarded "higher" order animals as having a lesser capacity for suffering than did the animal rights campaigners. The two groups also appeared to apply differential weight to the ideas of animal suffering and the value of science/experimentation when making judgments about the admissibility of animal experiments (see also Staffleu, 1994). The animal researchers seemed to be taking the expected value and benefit of experimentation as their central premise when making such decisions, while the animal rights campaigners appeared to be taking animal suffering as their starting point. The fact that these two premises are somewhat incompatible with one another (in the context of deciding whether or not to conduct an animal experiment) has perhaps led each group to reduce the others' central premise to the level of a secondary consideration.

Strong beliefs in both the value of science and the potential for appreciable suffering in animals certainly represents a challenging and uncomfortable position. Studies of how this and other viewpoints might be maintained may offer a fruitful direction for future research. In the meantime, the present study has illustrated some areas of common ground between apparently irreconcilable factions. In the past, biomedical scientists and groups concerned with the rights and welfare of animals have taken part in constructive discourses concerning the future use of animals in research (Elston, 1993). Perhaps the areas of agreement highlighted in this paper can offer some indication as to how and where these discussions might be most effectively continued and enhanced.

Note

1. Correspondence should be sent to Dr. Elizabeth Paul, Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 7 George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JZ, Scotland. I would like to thank Hal Herzog, Glenn Lyons, Mark Matfield, Mike Mendl, Anthony Podberscek, James Serpell, the Home Office and the Vegetarian Society for their help in the preparation of this manuscript. I would also like to thank the RSPCA for funding my research. Finally, many thanks to the people who kindly gave their time to take part in this research project.

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