The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002

Paul Waldau

The themes are as large as the print is small in this Oxford doctoral dissertation, condensed to 100,000 of the author’s original 300,000 words, attractively bound in 300 pages. Its dense, dry language, formal tone, and guarded inferences are what one would expect from a well-defended thesis in religion written by a Juris Doctor with 10 years of experience as a trial lawyer behind him. The somewhat stilted style can be formidable, but is not forbidding. Waldau dazzles the reader with rich interdisciplinary interfaces and sharp, laser-cut distinctions. His careful analysis of the concept of speciesism alone is worth the challenge of this academic read.

Speciesism is not simply a preference for one’s own kind; it is a prejudice against other kinds. Waldau takes us to the logical heart of the concept by construing it clearly in terms of “inclusion” and “exclusion.” Speciesism is including within the moral circle members of one’s own kind and excluding others solely on the basis of species membership.

Although Waldau believes that only humans can be speciesists because of the “abstract thinking required,” it follows that other beings capable of such thought could be speciesist as well. It also follows that because species membership rather than traits or qualities of individuals is crucial, honorary membership in a species is possible. This is what some supporters of The Great Ape Project (of which Waldau is an executive member) have in mind when they argue for “human” rights for gorillas, orangutans, chimpanzees, and bonobos.

Waldau’s thesis is that the concept of speciesism can be used to illuminate early Christian and Buddhist traditions but not that early Christians and/or Buddhists were speciesists -- a claim Waldau is careful not to make lest he be accused of anachronism.
To determine how the first Christians and Buddhists conceived of other living beings, Waldau studied scripture, theological systems, social institutions, iconography, moral codes, and myths, even learning Pali to sift through 25 volumes of ancient texts for references to what he calls the “key” species (elephants, cetaceans, apes). Challenging the widely held view that Buddhism is enlightened and Christianity benighted with regard to other beings, Waldau criticizes the “coarse groupings” and “caricatures” of them in each tradition. Arguing eloquently against the “prima facie case” that they fare better in Buddhism, Waldau concludes that the tradition whose tenets include reincarnation, ahimsa, loving kindness, and boundless compassion is not significantly different from its Western counterpart: In each tradition, he finds a discontinuity between humans and all other beings.
Speciesism as a key serves Waldau better than the “key” species. Although it is expedient, politically and pragmatically, to expand the moral circle by opening it to beings most like those already there, the implication is that those least like us are least likely to be included. Although the “social realities” of elephants are fascinating, so are the social realities of ants!

Although Waldau at first considers morality “the extension of sympathies to others,” he veers sharply away from this conception with his search for “principles of differentiated value,” which would let moral agents rank elephants above bacteria. (“The question is not whether to draw the line, but where.”) Waldau consistently emphasizes qualities such as self-awareness, symbolic and conceptual capacities, and intentionality not only to prove that these are not our exclusive domain but also to claim that beings with such qualities “merit” inclusion.

Waldau’s focus leaves him open to a charge similar to that of speciesism, a charge we could call “featuresism.” Waldau is aware that “characteristics are by no means constant within the classes” and that “traits…will vary” within populations. This he correctly sees as good reason not to use species membership as a moral criterion. However, it does not follow that we have good reason to use features instead. Indeed, it is a false dilemma to argue that if we do not include individuals because of their species membership we include them because of their characteristics. The argument is, what makes us morally considerable are certain qualities we have. Other beings have these, too. Other beings are morally considerable as well. This looks enlightened next to speciesism; with its dubious major premise, however, it really is a step toward a new moral order based on ranking.

Using features of individuals as standards for comparative evaluation does not challenge the prevailing “exclusivist” paradigm -- as Waldau wishes to do -- as much as it creates an inner circle of beings “whose lives are rich enough to merit [our] moral consideration.” By emphasizing a “constellation of general characteristics leading to rich social relationships among complex individuals,” Waldau seems to favor beings most like us. By giving good reason to include them -- but no reason not to include others -- he unintentionally implies their exclusion. What of the spider who lives in my house undisturbed, not because of her social or intellectual qualities (she is solitary and usually dormant) but simply because I have no reason to harm her?

It may be time to abandon the concept of the “moral circle” altogether, for its perimeter is drawn as sharply as any other line. Perhaps we should think instead in terms of a moral embrace offered in sympathy, informed by knowledge, and grounded not in features but in fairness. If we replace Waldau’s principles of differentiated value with those of inter-specific justice, we could approach his example of human versus (perhaps lethal) bacterium not by arguing that the human’s life is richer but by arguing that the human wants to live. If on a sinking lifeboat it makes some sense to save one’s dog friend rather than a human stranger, it is not because the being favored is a dog but because she is a friend. Thinking in terms of dynamic drama rather than in terms of rank ordering is a better way to challenge both speciesism and its accompanying exclusivist mentality.

Although debatable in part, The Specter of Speciesism as a whole is a stunning, scholarly achievement. No one who reads it will ever understand the lion lying down with the lamb in the same way again or use the concept of speciesism sloppily, as I have done. I am smarter for having read this book and cannot imagine the shelves of my personal library without this meticulously researched volume.

Note
* Kristin Aronson , Western Connecticut State University

 

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