Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.

H. Peter Steeves (Ed.).

In the past quarter-century, there has been an enormous number of studies by philosophers, both pro and con, on the moral status of animals other than humans. The vast majority of these studies have been done by philosophers who write in the English language, among whom the study of morality has flourished in this period. By way of contrast, the study of morality has not flourished in twentieth century continental philosophy. For example, the two thinkers who are arguably the greatest twentieth century philosophers from the continent (Sartre in France and Heidegger in Germany) failed to produce anything like developed moral theories.

This book is the first collection of essays on the topic of animal rights from the perspectives of those who study continental philosophy (mostly French and German philosophy). These essays will be of use both to those who are well versed in continental thought, in that the ontological and moral status of animals is not a well-worn path in that tradition, and to those who philosophize in the English language style who also are interested in animal rights. In the continental tradition, however, the word “rights” needs scare quotes in that all or almost all of the authors (unfortunately, I think) seem to be skeptical of rights, in particular, and of liberal political philosophy, in general.

Two essays are especially instructive: (a) Wood’s treatment of deconstructionism explains why deconstructionists are skeptical of any sort of closure in moral philosophy; and (b) McNeill’s treatment of Heidegger’s view of animals, which concentrates on his 1929-1930 lectures, explicates the differences among beings who are weltlos (worldless), like stones; weltarm (world poor), like animals; and weltbildend (world-forming), like human beings.

Despite the forward by Tom Regan, this book does not contain essays where the insights of continental philosophers regarding animals are compared and contrasted in any detail to the insights of the major English-language philosophers who have written on the topic of animal rights (the utilitarian Singer, the deontologist Regan, the virtue ethicist Clark). But perhaps this is to be expected in that philosophers have unfortunately become used to ignoring those who are not in their camp or style of doing philosophy: English-language pragmatists or especially analytic philosophers tend to ignore those in continental philosophy and vice versa.

But now there is a book that makes such a dialogue possible. Only two essays in the book will seem virtually unintelligible to English language philosophers (obviously not, in itself, a condemnation of these essays): the odd essay on bestiality by Lingis and an essay on animals and becoming by Birke and Pirisi.

In addition to the essays by Wood and McNeill mentioned above, there are other instructive essays by Acampora, who uses the thought of Nagel (“What Is It Like To Be a Bat?”) to explore experiential access to members of other species; by Langer on animals in Nietzsche’s philosophy; by Behnke on intercorporeality in Merleau-Ponty; by Steeves (who also writes the introduction to the book) on fear in animals; by Hart on the topic of human transcendence of animality; by Dallery on the open boundary between human beings and animals; and by Laycock on viewing animals as animals.

However, even the best essays in this volume deserve criticism. For example, in Wood’s insightful treatment of a dialogue between Derrida and Nancy titled, “Eating Well,” Wood makes it clear that Derrida, who says that he is a vegetarian “in his soul,” is not saying anything about real vegetarianism. This has something to do with the death of the subject, it seems, and perhaps also with the death of any sense that reasoned discourse can, or should, guide how we ought to live. Or so it seems. That is, Wood is far too easy on Derrida’s elusive (or better, slippery) style of doing philosophy -- as I see things.

To take another example, McNeill’s magisterial study of Heidegger’s views of animals again is too kind to its subject. Heidegger’s stance regarding an “abyss” between human beings and animals “that can be bridged by no mediation whatsoever” cries out for critical analysis, as does his belief in “the complete divergence of the two” [the animal and the human]. I could be quite wrong, but it seems that McNeill is sympathetic to Heidegger’s distinctions here. Or better, if McNeill is not sympathetic to these distinctions, he should have stated so more clearly.

I should close on a conciliatory note, however. I learned a great deal from this book. And I assume that anyone interested in both philosophy and animals would benefit greatly from a careful reading of this collection of essays.

* Daniel A. Dombrowski, Seattle University
 

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