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Civil Disobedience: A Case Study in
Factors of Effectiveness
Courtney L. Dillard *
Abstract
Between 1989 and 1998, The Fund for Animals organized protests
and acts of civil disobedience against the largest pigeon shoot
in this country. During this long campaign, The Fund used a
variety of approaches to argue for its position. This article
focuses on two distinct enactments of civil disobedience at the
Hegins shoot. Through an historical comparative analysis, the
article describes the acts of civil disobedience and the context
within which they took place for both 1992 and 1996. The article
focuses on audience reaction, including media representatives,
in order to tease out why onlookers may have found one instance
of civil disobedience more compelling than another. The findings
suggest that the effectiveness of civil disobedience may be
determined in part by the way it is enacted. Specifically, civil
disobedience is more persuasive when enacted in clearly
nonviolent/non-threatening ways and when participants
demonstrate not only a willingness to suffer for their beliefs
but also an interest in communicating that suffering to
onlookers.
Advocating for animals in this country dates as far back as the
colonial period. In 1641, legal arguments were put forth that
made cruelty to domestic animals unlawful in the Massachusetts
Bay Colony. By the mid-1800s, several social movement
organizations, such as the American Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) and the Philadelphia Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals were created to advocate
for animal welfare in the wider courts of public opinion. Over
time, the numbers of people and organizations arguing on behalf
of animals grew substantially. In addition, the tactics and
strategies employed in such advocacy became more varied and
creative.
Such changes perhaps are most notable in surveying the
activities of social movement organizations in the last two
decades. The 1980s witnessed not only major ideological shifts
from welfare to rights but also tactical shifts from
behind-the-scenes negotiation in the courtroom or legislative
bodies to very public acts of protest and civil disobedience. As
the media, particularly television, quickly became an essential
part of educating and persuading the public on animal issues,
tactics that gained media coverage were often employed. Because
one of the enduring news values is controversy and conflict
(Stephens, 1980), the potential for acts of civil disobedience
often ensured media attention. Today, some activists and
organizations wholly embrace the use of civil disobedience.
Whether it's members of a national group trespassing on
corporate property in order to disrupt stockholder meetings or
members of local organizations trying to block access to fur
salons, thousands of protestors have used civil disobedience to
make their point.
Yet, even as activists participate in civil disobedience to
reveal particular atrocities against animals and encourage a
public conversation about the nonhuman-human animal
relationship, questions as to the effectiveness of these
activities continually arise within the overarching movement.
Some organizations, often those seeking more moderate gains and
focusing on key political or business figures, believe that
civil disobedience reduces the movement's legitimacy and makes
their advocacy much more difficult. They argue that those in
power do not make distinctions between animal groups and
therefore are associated with, and penalized for, publicized
acts of civil disobedience. Activists in support of civil
disobedience often respond to these arguments by suggesting that
civil disobedience sheds light on important issues and
stimulates public response. Many of these activists believe that
media coverage is the key to movement success.
Although the debate is an intriguing one, this article seeks to
shift the grounds of discussion. Instead of wrestling with the
question of whether civil disobedience is an effective advocacy
tool in general, I ask if the effectiveness of civil
disobedience may be determined in part by the way it is enacted.
To pursue this question, I analyze a specific case study of a
long-term animal advocacy campaignC The Fund for Animals'
campaign to abolish the Hegins pigeon shoot. In this article, I
compare the enactment of civil disobedience in two years of
protest that differed considerably from one another.
Summary of Data Collection and Methodology
This article is a condensed version of a much larger analysis of
the Hegins pigeon shoot and various attempts to abolish it on
the part of The Fund for Animals. For the larger project, data
was collected over a period of six months from both archival
research and in-depth interviews. The archival research focused
mainly on materials produced by print and broadcast media
sources. Other documents I examined include Fund press releases,
pamphlets, video materials and internal documents such as
letters sent to particular volunteers. Interviews were also
conducted with a number of sources. These include Fund leaders
Heidi Prescott and Mike Markarian, shoot organizer Bob Tobash,
and five onlookers, many associated with the local media, who
wished to remain anonymous.
While the original study considered a variety of advocacy
tactics and detailed a much more complete history of the event
and protests, this piece will focus on two distinct and
different enactments of civil disobedience. Through a historical
comparative analysis, I describe the acts of civil disobedience
and the context within which they took place for both years. I
then focus on audience reaction in order to tease out why
onlookers may have found one instance of civil disobedience more
compelling than another. In many ways, this is a grounded theory
approach - allowing the voices from the field to inform the
theoretical underpinnings of the piece, rather than finding
instances in the field that support the theory (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967).
Hegins - A Case Analysis
The Event
The Fred Coleman Memorial Shoot, the shoot's official name,
began more than a half century ago in the early 1930s. Pigeon
shooting is a rather common sport in the rural counties of
Pennsylvania, but the shoot at Hegins quickly grew to become the
largest event of its kind in the country. Each Labor Day
weekend, people from a number of surrounding counties and states
descended on the town to shoot over 5,000 birds. Funds from the
event are used to raise money to continue maintenance on the
park and subsidize such local services as the firehouse (B.
Tobash, personal communication, February 20, 1997).
The rules surrounding the shoot and the manner in which it is
conducted haven't changed since the event's earliest days.
Organizers of the shoot purchase pigeons from breeders or those
who have trapped the birds in the wild. They then keep the
pigeons in cages, often cramped together for days or even weeks
before the event. Participants in the shoot, limited to 250 at
Hegins, pay an entry fee, typically $75, for a chance to shoot
as many pigeons as possible. The shooter with the largest number
of hits at the end of the weekend wins the event.
During the shoot, participants stand ready with their guns and
then shout "Pull," ordering the strings tied to the cage doors
to be pulled and the doors opened, releasing the pigeons one at
a time. Pigeons either fly out or, having been weakened by their
captivity, walk out of the cages. At that moment, the shooter
fires, attempting to kill the pigeon (H. Prescott, personal
communication, October 25, 1996). If the shooter misses, the
bird may fly out of the park boundaries to safety. If wounded,
the pigeon often lands in the shooting field. While the shooters
aim to kill, they often only wound the birds. One field estimate
suggested that only 30% of the birds died instantly (Fund Press
Release, 1996). It is the duty of the trapper boys, typically
about age 12, to retrieve the wounded birds from the shooting
field and kill them by decapitating them over the rim of a
barrel or with their bare hands. Although it is not advocated,
birds also are killed by being jumped upon, left to suffocate in
the barrel of bodies, or occasionally ripped apart. Once the
shoot ends, the dead birds are thrown away as trash (Becker,
1996).
The Activist Response
Starting in 1989, The Fund for Animals became the animal rights
group chiefly responsible for organizing the protest of the
event. While their primary goal was to have the shoot
permanently stopped, Fund leaders believed that they first had
to affect public sentiment in order to accomplish this. Leaders
at The Fund, Heidi Prescott and Mike Markarian, felt they could
best do this by bringing media attention to the event and its
cruelty. They hoped that mass demonstrations and acts of civil
disobedience would encourage the media to cover the event, gain
them sympathy, and rally public pressure in support of a ban on
the event. In the years following 1989, they worked to bring
animal rights activists to Hegins and encouraged acts of civil
disobedience on behalf of the birds.
Heidi Prescott, present director of The Fund, believes that
civil disobedience is an effective form of direct action for a
number of reasons. In an interview, she explained that "civil
disobedience is an excellent component of any campaign against
specific abuses." She stated that it is important to try to work
through the system initially, attempting to negotiate as The
Fund had in the courts and the legislature. It is only when
these channels resist or reject what the group considers to be a
plea for justice that civil disobedience is used as a tactic.
Prescott believes that the greatest benefit of civil
disobedience is the heightened awareness of the issue by the
general public, most often through the media. She argues that
acts of disobedience "send a message that something is so wrong
that people are willing to risk their safety and freedom to stop
that injustice." Because people know "in their heart of hearts
that it [the shooting of the pigeons] is wrong," acts of civil
disobedience call forth emotion and force people to consider the
morality of the event (H. Prescott, personal communication,
October 25, 1996).
One of the other benefits Prescott associates with civil
disobedience in the case of Hegin is the actual saving of lives
by freeing the birds or disrupting the shoot and reducing the
numbers of birds shot. The act of saving a life is beneficial
not only to the pigeon but also to the activist, who may spend
years fighting for the rights of animals and never play such an
obvious role in helping a specific individual. This activity and
others, such as bond solidarity in jail, "binds members of the
movement together and empowers them like nothing else" (H.
Prescott, personal communication, October 25, 1996).
With this positive outlook on the possibilities of protest and
civil disobedience, The Fund began to plan direct action
strategy. From 1989 to 1992, the number of protesters attending
the event grew rapidly. Hegins quickly became one of the main
"battlegrounds" for animal rights and the quintessential place
to stand up for animals.
The Protest in 1992
Before the event in 1992, The Fund encouraged activists to
protest the shoot, running advertisements in animal activist
magazines and networking through other national and local
groups. It created a press release promising to stage "what is
likely to be the nation's largest ever protest on behalf of
animals" (Fund Press Release, 1992). The goal was to have as
many people as possible engage in protest activities and
willingly be arrested for breaking various laws. Though The Fund
had been successful in attracting 1,500 protestors, before the
event it did little to organize protest activity. A workshop in
civil disobedience was optional, and no particular acts were
arranged.
Because there had been no attempt to regulate the behavior of
the activists, the overall context for the protest was one of
chaos and tension. Several incidents led to a feeling of threat
and anger. Videos of the event show the Black Berets, an animal
rights militia of sorts, taunting spectators, calling them
"pigeon sucking perverts," and trying to elicit a response. All
people interviewed, including Prescott, agree that there were
obscenities, insults, and screaming matches "breaking out all
over the park" (H. Prescott; Media representatives #1- #4,
personal communications, February 20, 1997). A representative of
the local police force attested to the fact that often these
escalated to "pushing and shoving matches," each side blaming
the other for instigation.
The acts of civil disobedience were also chaotic and largely
spontaneous. According to Prescott, those engaging in civil
disobedience were "only loosely organized." As shooters started
to wound and kill birds, protestors reacted emotionally. They
rushed toward the field in an attempt to stop the shooting or
pick up wounded birds. As the video and media coverage
demonstrate, they often committed the acts of civil disobedience
with angry facial expressions and screams of obscenities or
unintelligible phrases. While they may have been moved by
concern for the pigeons, their reactions conveyed much more
anger than sympathy. Typically, they were handcuffed after
trying to free the birds or placing their bodies between the
birds and the shooters. In addition, other types of law-breaking
activities were occurring including clear incidents of
harassment. Most of the 114 activists were arrested on charges
of disorderly conduct, criminal trespass, theft and harassment (Helgeson,
1992).
Period of Reconsideration
Following the protests of 1992, leaders at The Fund assessed
their situation. It was clear that despite many acts of civil
disobedience, they had not been able to gain much public
support. The most disturbing trend that Fund leaders noticed was
the media's approach to the protest. Only minimal attention was
given to the actual plight of the pigeons. Reporters chose to
focus on the more controversial conflict between supporters and
protesters of the shoot. The conflict had captured the media's
desire for the sensational, leaving the question of the morality
of the event largely unasked and unanswered. A sampling of
headlines shows that the large majority of papers focused on the
number of protesters arrested, or in attendance, rather than
cruelty concerns.
Another unintended and unfortunate result of the protest was
that instead of decreasing the numbers attending the event, the
actual numbers rose in huge proportions. Residents of the town
enjoyed an economic boom as their services were utilized and
products bought. They also appeared to enjoy the attention paid
to the small town by the national and even international media.
Although the protest had been planned to bring negative
attention and shame to the town, it actually brought a
much-needed economic upswing (B. Tobash, personal communication,
February 20, 1997). For this reason, even those residents who
did not participate in the shoot began to see the event in a
positive light.
H. Prescott and M. Makarian noted that the resulting media
coverage and the rise in attendance necessitated a shift in
protest activity at the event (personal communications, October
5, 1996). They wanted to demonstrate their sympathy more
accurately for the birds and encourage others to adopt their
position concerning the shoot. Between 1993 and 1995, The Fund
requested that activists, in large part, avoid the event.
Instead, a small group of volunteers focused on rescuing wounded
pigeons and ignoring participants and taunting onlookers. Their
activities clearly were both non-violent and non-threatening.
In 1996, The Fund decided to reinstate some form of civil
disobedience. Leaders at The Fund focused on developing an
approach to civil disobedience that would better communicate
their objections to the shoot and generally be more effective in
persuading both the local and national audience to speak out
against the event. In so doing, they tried to better understand
their audience and more clearly represent themselves. The plan
they devised accounted not only for how the civil disobedience
would be enacted but also for the overarching protest context in
which it would take place.
Protests 1996
The correspondence with activists before the event in 1996
differs notably from that in 1992. Instead of encouraging large
numbers to attend, The Fund solicited only a small group of
activists. As "peacekeepers," they were told that their job was
to assure that "public attention - including media attention -
is not distracted from the cruelty of the event by loud and
potentially violent confrontations between activists and shoot
supporters" (H. Prescott, personal communication, October 25,
1996). In addition, they were to make sure that no one was "put
at risk or injured" from any confrontations that did arise.
Instead of leaving the activists without a strong sense of
purpose or correct behavior, The Fund (1996) sent out a document
that reads:
It is essential that our behavior today win us allies in the
legislature and among the general public. Our golden rule must
be do unto shoot supporters as you would want to be seen doing
unto them on television. This year's shoot will be intensively
covered by the media, who will be looking for anger, drama and
confrontation. We, on the other hand, represent caring and
compassion. Our speech and behavior should always demonstrate
those qualities to the press and the public. please! for the
sake of the pigeons:
Do not engage in name calling, taunting, or trading insults or
obscenities with shoot supporters.
Do not make obscene or insulting gestures.
Do not make any statement or any movement that could reasonably
be interpreted as threatening, even if you are provoked.
If you are insulted or taunted, ignore it. Do not respond unless
you are confident that you can keep your cool and speak without
hostility or anger.
If you are assaulted, or believe that you may be, leave the area
immediately. Report any assaults to the police.
Do not threaten retaliation.
Do not engage in shoving matches or initiate any physical
contact with shoot supporters. In summation, be dignified,
courteous, and non-violent at all times, even under provocation.
You are here to save pigeons, directly by rescue or indirectly
by documenting. This is too important to let yourself be
distracted by people who want us to fail.
The context of the protest also was much different in 1996.
Because the protestors were focused entirely on saving and
treating wounded birds, their activities appeared much more
purposeful. They continued the tradition of the last several
years by not interacting with the shooters or onlookers who
seemed intent on distracting them. The protestors did not shout
or threaten anyone in attendance. In addition, the smaller
numbers created a less threatening mob presence and allowed for
audience members and the media to better see the individual acts
of those caring for the birds.
In the midst of this context, those participating in the civil
disobedience followed the plans that were carefully constructed
prior to their arrival. Twelve activists in two groups of six
entered the shooting fields before the event began. Locking
steel bicycle locks together, they bound themselves to one
another at the neck and then lay down. Their goal was twofold:
(a) to prevent the start of the shoot for as long as possible
and (b) to make the argument, with their bodies, that the shoot
was unjust and should be discontinued (H. Prescott, personal
communication, February 21, 1997).
In conducting the civil disobedience, the activists remained
silent and at a distance from the crowd. They lay flat on the
ground, putting their "health and safety in jeopardy" (Police
representative, personal communication, February 20, 1997). Even
when the crowd tried to provoke the disobedients, they remained
calm and did not respond in any way. When finally they were cut
free from the kryptonite octopus, they did not resist arrest and
were quietly removed from the field. The shoot was held up for
close to two hours. The disobedients acted totally without
violence (physical or verbal). In being bound together, they
attempted to represent the captivity and helplessness of the
birds. This small act of suffering was put forth as a type of
representation for the ultimate suffering of the pigeons who
were to be wounded and killed.
The Reactions - Audience and Media
Having described and contrasted the protests in 1992 and 1996, I
now want to take up the question of audience reaction. Did
audience members notice the difference between the two years? If
they did, what did they see as different and did they feel one
approach was more effective than another in making the argument
against the shoot? Through interviews with several sources in
Hegins, I am able to offer some tentative answers to these
questions. Onlookers often characterize the protest and the acts
of civil disobedience in 1992 as disorderly and threatening.
Representatives from local media sources concluded that in 1992
the activists' arguments were lost in the angry tone and, as a
result, activists were not successful in communicating their
messages. Here are a few of their comments:
In years past, the actions, the screaming and yelling had a
negative effect on how the protesters were looked at. When they
originally came, they were insulting. They would yell at the
people and their acts of civil disobedience were more random.
They ended up with a negative effect, even though they had a
positive goal in not hurting the animals - but it turned out to
be negative, because they were not organized and the civil
disobedience was rampant. They used the wrong means to achieve
their ends. Protesters over the years [before the change in
tactics] had more of a negative impact, than a positive one,
even on an ambivalent person. (Media representative #2, personal
communication, February 20, 1997)
The tone was aggressive. An observer may have felt frightened to
some degree. You couldn't know what would happen. Although it is
hard to generalize, the typical protester [in 1992] came with a
sign saying "Hegins residents are barbarians and savages,"
wanted to and did engage in oral arguments, wanted to disrupt
the shoot by running onto the fields, whatever they could do to
stop the shoot. When they first came in, they made themselves
very easy for residents to dislikeC partly in how they framed
their argument…. It was hard for people to take their argument
seriously because they were insulted and put off from the start.
(Media representative #4, personal interview, February 20, 1997)
The interpretation of the protesters and civil disobedients as
threatening, insulting, and generally chaotic was often passed
on from media representatives to the wider public. A sampling of
local and national newscasts showed the activists running onto
the field and screaming into the crowd. Accompanying this
footage is commentary depicting the activists as aggressive and
emotional in contrast to the event participants who only are
participating in a tradition that raises money for charity. It
is obvious from these clips that the media ignored the
activists' arguments and that the activists appeared in a rather
negative light.
Interpretations and representations of the protest activity were
markedly different in 1996. Prescott notes that in that year the
protest and, specifically, the civil disobedience were very
strategically planned. The protesters wanted to restructure
their appearance to serve as a clear argument from conscience.
The signs, chanting, and random insulting of the crowd were
eliminated. The civil disobedience was also constructed in a
clearer and more purposeful way.
Having the 12 disobedients lie down in silence "passed a very
strong message - there wasn't a lot you could criticize about
what they did" (H. Prescott, personal communication, February
21, l997). Their activities in 1996 were focused on creating a
certain meaning, one in which the average onlookerC unfamiliar
with the controversy - would be persuaded to see that their
cause was just and the activities of the other side were not:
When our side is lying on the field, not saying a word, neck to
neck to stop something so horrific, and also saving birds to
give them care, and their side is yelling obscenities, drinking,
as an outside observer looking in, you cannot help concluding
which side is right and which side is wrong (H. Prescott,
personal communication, February 21, 1997).
Again, this seems to be supported by the observers I
interviewed:
If I had to choose a side, it would be with the protesters, as
they were nonviolent this year [1996]. I didn't see anything
violent about them. They used the civil disobedience method for
the most part; they had a very peaceful protest. The fact that
they rushed onto the field and just lay there was definitely
nonviolent….So, I did have that kind of bias towards them, in
the way they handled themselves. As far as the public
[observers/supporters] in viewing them, the public was of course
much more raucous and loud and obnoxious and unruly. And, of
course, [there was] some violence from the crowd [toward] the
protesters, which did have an effect on me to an extent (Media
representative #1, personal communication, February 20, 1997).
This was the first year they actually practiced 'true' civil
disobedience, and it was quite effective. This [type of] civil
disobedience is much more acceptable (Media representative #2,
personal communication, February 20, 1997).
[The protest] brought some light to magnify the argument. It
showed the outsiders' view. We took for granted, I guess that
this was a normal part of life, then we got to see the other
side of the coin (Media representative #3, personal
communication, February 20, 1997).
[They] decided to restrict the civil disobedience, chanting
taunting oral arguments, and concentrate on the argument of
animal rights. For the most part, they concentrated on
documenting…and veterinary rescue stands. They chose to take the
high ground morally, not to lower themselves to trading insults
with local residents. I thought that this was a very good
idea….It became a lot easier to sympathize with the protesters
when they stopped acting like jerks, which is what they were
when the protests began (Media representative #4, personal
communication, February 20, 1997).
While the national media certainly highlighted the civil
disobedience in 1996, both papers and newscasts alike noted that
the context was much calmer and the activists had something to
say. In a brief review of five newscasts that reported on the
shoot, three included a short interview with Prescott about the
reasons behind the protest and use of civil disobedience.
Instead of portraying the activists as obscene and obnoxious,
commentary that accompanied the image of the disobedients locked
together concentrated on the question of cruelty and the efforts
to stop the shoot. In addition, the media presented the violence
of the shoot supporters. Both local and national newscasts
showed them carrying signs and screaming at those on the field
to get up.
Discussion
At the protests of the pigeon shoot in Hegins, leaders of The
Fund wanted to communicate a message about the suffering of the
birds. Initially, this suffering aroused their anger, and they
represented themselves in anger. At the protest in 1992, those
involved in the protest often hurled insults at the crowd, which
included a number of children. Their tones were angry, and more
than a few loud verbal exchanges were witnessed. Those involved
in the civil disobedience were only loosely organized with
individuals typically acting by themselves. The combination of
random running onto the field, close proximity, and angry tones
and facial expressions gave the protest and the civil
disobedience a chaotic and hostile appearance. The news media
recorded and disseminated this image to a larger public who saw
angry images and heard very little about the ethical debate
surrounding the protest. In 1992, the protesters and those
engaged in civil disobedience were neither nonviolent nor able
to demonstrate clearly a willingness to suffer.
In 1992, as a result of loose planning and unsupervised
activists, The Fund was unable to use civil disobedience as an
effective argument to gain public support. Although they claimed
to be arguing for compassion, the activists appeared
threatening, angry, and even violent. The activists "bastardized
the use of civil disobedience [because] once you become violent
or even verbally acostive, civil disobedience is lost to
something else" (Media representative #1, personal
communication, February 20, 1997). The onlookers were able to
dismiss the activists and their point of view specifically
because their argument was lost in the hostile tone of the
protest, which was more threatening than persuasive.
During the period of reconsideration following the protests in
1992, The Fund sought to restructure its appearance in order to
make a more effective argument. Through both a close examination
of what had prevented its message from being successful and a
return to its original goals for civil disobedience, The Fund
crafted ways to appear more favorably to the public. It hoped to
increase the likelihood that its argument would be understood
and accepted. At the heart of this change was a renewed
commitment to use protest and civil disobedience as an argument
from conscience rather than from pure emotion.
The most important aspect of civil disobedience that was
recognized and respected by the activists in 1996 was
nonviolence. The disobedients realized that their argument could
not be put forth in violence, as those who were threatened would
be unlikely to acknowledge some common ground and therefore
could not be persuaded. Almost everyone interviewed agreed that
the protesters were more effective when they engaged in "true"
civil disobedience and abandoned the angry and violent tone set
early on (Media representative #2, personal communication,
February 20, 1997). One representative from the local media even
suggested that if "they [the protesters] keep it toned down, at
a low level, they can win over a good majority of the solid
decent people in the town" (Media representative #2, personal
communication, February 20, 1997).
The second key aspect of civil disobedience activists
acknowledged in 1996 was a willingness to suffer for their
beliefs and to communicate that suffering to onlookers. Instead
of showing anger at the treatment of the pigeons during the
shoot, the disobedients and other activists tried to represent
the suffering of the pigeons through their own suffering. It was
only when the onlookers could identify with the suffering of the
activists (as we all are capable of suffering and wish to avoid
it) that the audience recognized a common ground on which to
begin discussion. Through their silence, bound and submissive
posture, and acceptance of arrest, those involved in the civil
disobedience symbolized and accounted for the suffering of the
birds.
When members of the audience recognized this relationship, they
seemed more likely to question why the activists were willing to
suffer for this cause. These questions called forth thoughts
regarding their own feelings on the matter. The position, which
had been taken for granted, that the pigeon shoot was not a
moral issue was finally considered as a result of this public
argument. When the issue entered this public realm through the
unsettling activity of civil disobedience, there could be a
number of exchanges that reshaped the public's position on the
issue.
In many ways, 1996 was the turning point in the battle over
pigeon shoots in Hegins, Pennsylvania. In 1997 and 1998, The
Fund basically stayed away from the event, choosing to
capitalize on growing support for its position. The Fund pursued
cruelty cases in court and lobbied for bills in the state
legislature. After a series of legal rounds, supporters of the
shoot agreed to discontinue the event. In 1999, and for every
Labor Day since then, the shoot fields in Hegins have been
silent. After 10 years and various approaches to the tactic of
civil disobedience, the activists are finally crying victory.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have grappled with the complex question of what
conditions may make the use of civil disobedience more effective
as a tactic on behalf of animals. Although there can be no doubt
that every protest context is a unique event, non-violence and a
willingness to suffer are important aspects that leaders should
consider as they decide what civil disobedience must "look like"
if it is used in hopes of being persuasive as argument. Those
who wish to advance the movement should consider strategically
whether a certain act of civil disobedience truly serves as an
argument on behalf of animals by appearing to the targeted
audience in a way it can understand. If the audience does not
respond sympathetically to an approach, movement leaders may
wish to employ a different tactic or change the way in which
their future acts of civil disobedience appear.
In order to investigate further the factors contributing to
effective civil disobedience, other studies should be conducted.
Although case studies provide a deeper look into a unique case,
future research could take a more quantitative approach. Asking
onlookers at protest events to fill out surveys regarding their
reactions to certain instances of civil disobedience would be
very informative. Other approaches may include using focus
groups or performing content analysis on mediated materials. A
study looking at word choice on the part of reporters in
describing particular acts of civil disobedience could be very
informative.
Whatever the methodology, the issue of effectiveness is an
important one. Although there can be no doubt that negotiation,
legislation, and litigation are vital tools for activists, there
is a power in the public nature of civil disobedience. This
power comes from the intensity of conscience that civil
disobedience allows the public to see on the part of the
activists. Civil disobedience can be an empowering activity for
both activists and the general public. Activists join together
and publicly advocate their position. The general public
witnesses commitments and challenges to the system that extend
beyond the voting booth and individual consumer choices. When
civil disobedience is truly effective, it can change society's
relationship to animals and even revitalize our public sphere.
* Courtney L. Dillard, University of
Texas
Correspondence should be sent to Courtney L. Dillard, Department
of Communication Studies, CMA 7.114, University of Texas,
Austin, TX 78712. (Fax) 512. 471. 3504. E-mail:
cldillard@mail.utexas.edu
References
Becker, C. (1996). [Videotape] Gunblast, culture clash.
Fund Press Release. (September 2, 1992). Silver Spring, MD:
Author.
Fund Press Release. (September 6, 1996) Silver Spring, MD:
Author.
Glaser, B. & Stauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded
theory. Chicago: Aldine.
Stephens, M. (1980). Broadcast news. New York: Holt, Rienhart &
Winston.
The Fund. (1996). Guidelines for animal protection activists at
Hegins, 1996. Unpublished document.
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