The
Animal Question in Anthropology
Barbara
Noske 1
The Netherlands
Anthropologists
commonly define their discipline, anthropology, as the study
of anthropos (humankind) and think it perfectly natural
to pay little or no attention to the nonhuman realm of animalkind.
Of course, animals do figure in anthropological studies but
they do so mainly as raw material for human acts and human thought.
Anthropology has a long tradition of studying the ways in which
human groups and cultures deal with and conceive of their natural
environment, including other species. Such studies usually confine
themselves to humans in their capacities as agents and subjects
who act upon and think about animals.
Consequently,
animals tend to be portrayed as passive objects that are dealt
with and thought and felt about. Far from being considered agents
or subjects in their own right, the animals themselves are virtually
overlooked by anthropologists. They and their relations with
humans tend to be considered unworthy of anthropological interest.
Most anthropologists would think it perfectly natural to pay
little or no attention to the way things look, smell, feel,
taste or sound to the animals involved. Consequently, questions
pertaining to animal welfare in the West or in the Third World
rarely figure in anthropological thought.
Anthropologists
treat animals as integral parts of human economic constellations
and human-centered ecosystems: They are economic resources,
commodities and means of production for human use.
Animal-based
human economies have been studied extensively by anthropologists,
who have regarded as their main question whether or not various
human practices with animals are economically or ecologically
rational (seen from the human point of view). Only in those
cases where semi-wild animals still retain some control over
their own whereabouts do anthropologists sometimes look at the
advantages of existing human-animal arrangements for the animals.
The discipline
of anthropology is blatantly anthropocentric. At best, humans
and animals are taken to interact within one communal ecosystem
and most anthropologists' attention is directed toward understanding
humans rather than animals. Questions focus on humans and humans
alone. Do animal population dynamics, diet and mobility have
no influence on human culture?
Apart
from animals that function as subsistence factors, anthropologists
have duly called attention to animals that are made to serve
non-subsistence human purposes, for instance as objects of prestige
or sacrifice or as totems. Animals in this capacity have been
vested with religious significance and with symbolic and metaphorical
power. In addition, anthropologists have focused on the roles
that animals play in human ceremonial and religious life.
Anthropological
interest in animal totems or animal symbols is no guarantee
against an anthropocentric approach. More often than not such
interest serves as an excuse to stop at human constructs instead
of paying attention to the animals themselves.
When
challenged on this issue most anthropologists argue that for
questions about animals per se one had better turn to sciences
such as biology or ethology. To point out to them that in addition
to a human-animal relationship there also exists something
like an animal-human relationship, and that totally
ignoring the latter will lead to a one-sided subject-object
approach is a waste of time. As present the anthropocentrism
in anthropology goes virtually unchallenged.
Understanding
Anthropology's Anthropocentrism
The
reason for this is the commonly held view that animals in themselves
have nothing to offer a science which is concerned with the
social and the cultural. Anthropologists and sociologists as
well as scholars in the humanities generally assume that sociality
and culture do not exist outside the human realm. These phenomena
are taken to be exclusively human, a view which lands anthropologists
and their colleagues in the circular argument that animals,
not being human, cannot possibly be social or cultural beings.
Social
scientists characterize humans in terms of the material and
social arrangements these humans make and by which they are
also shaped: as beings who socially constitute and are constituted.
Humans
are taken to make their own history and while their natural
history was once believed to be made for them, modern humanity
increasingly tries to shape that history as well. By contrast,
animals are believed to have only a natural history, which is
made for them and which has caused them to evolve in the first
place.
Unlike
human beings, animals tend to be regarded as organisms primarily
governed by their individually-based genetic constitutions.
But this conviction turns out to be an a priori one, given the
circumstance that almost no student of human society and culture
asks the same questions about animals as are asked about humans.
One does not look for the social and the cultural where surely
it cannot be found, outside the human sphere! However, if one
preconceives humans to be the sole beings capable of creating
society, culture and language, one excludes animal forms of
society, culture and language by definition. On the whole, animals
figure in anthropology not only as objects for human subjects
to act upon but also as antitheses of all that according to
the social sciences makes humans human. The social sciences
present themselves pre-eminently as the sciences of discontinuity
between humans and animals.
There
are few social scientists willing to ask what animal-human continuity
might mean in terms of their own field. Thus sociologists do
not bother about a sociology of animals. Neither do most social
scientists question the common hierarchical subject-object approach
to the human-animal relationship; least of all do they pose
questions as to the ways in which animal subjects might relate
to human subjects. Social scientists tend to treat our continuity
with animals as a purely material residue from a pre historical
past. At the most our "animalness" (our body) is taken
to have formed the material base upon which our real "humanness"
(mind, sociality, culture, language) could arise. Our humanness
is built on an animal basis of sorts, with a vital addition.
Biological
Essentialism: For Animals only
At
the same time social scientists tend to be on their guard against
any form of biological essentialism. They hasten to point out
the dangers of explaining social differences between people
in terms of biological essences such as race or sex (and rightly
so).
Ironically,
many scientists who hold this view still gravitate towards those
essentialist positions they claim to detest as soon as
another biological category comes into view, our species barrier.
Suddenly clear-cut notions as to what is human and
what is animal crop up among anthropologists and other
social scientists. Their outspoken criticisms of those who think
in terms of other biological essences lose credibility in the
face of their own assumptions about human and animal essences.
Implicitly, anthropologists do have conceptions pertaining to
a universal human essence: It seems first and foremost to be
embodied in our "non-animalness" and in the animal's
"non-humanness." But if humanness is identical with
non-animalness, then what constitutes animalness and what are
animals?
As we
have noted before, hardly any social scientist shows interest
in animals for their own sake, let alone cares to ask sociological
and anthropological questions about them. Given the exclusion
of animals from their respective fields, what grounds do these
social scientists have for making such confident statements
about animals, especially about what animals are not? What conceptions
do these scientists have of animals and where did they get them?
In an
earlier work (Noske, Humans and other Animals , 1989), I described
the extent to which the social scientific image of animals and
animalness has been shaped by sciences which are often denounced
as reductionist and objectifying. Such reductionism is only
denounced, however, when directed at human beings. The natural
sciences, particularly the biobehavioral sciences, are responsible
for creating the current animal image. The biobehavioral scientific
characterization of animals is presented in terms of observable
traits and mechanisms thought to be encoded in the animal's
genetic make-up. Unlike genetic transmission, human cultural
transmission does not pass over the heads of the individuals
concerned. It involves the active if not always conscious participation
of the transmitters (the teachers) as well as that of the recipients
(the learners). It is not as if the former are active and the
latter passive.
Biology
and ethology have somehow become the sciences of animalkind.
It is from these sciences that social scientists (the sciences
of humankind) uncritically and largely unwittingly derive their
own image of animals and animalness. Animals have become associated
with biological and genetic explanations.
This
has led to an "anti-animal reaction" among scholars
in the humanities. They bluntly state that evolutionary theory
is all right for the interpretation of animals and animal actions
but not for humans. Hardly any critic of biological determinism
will stop to think whether animals indeed can be understood
in narrowly genetic and biological terms.
Many
people in or allied with the social sciences err in accepting
biology's image of animals as the animal essence.
They fail to appreciate that that image of animals is a de-animalized
biological construct. The anthropocentric social sciences view
their own subject matter, humans, as animal in basis plus a
vital addition. This view turns animals automatically into reduced
humans. The argument goes as follows: If biologists and ethologists
are reductionists this is because animals, as reduced beings,
prompt them to think so.
However,
it may well be that animals continue to be objectified because
biologists prefer to remain reductionist and because social
scientists for their part prefer to remain anthropocentric.
Reexamining
Human-Animal Continuity
Does
the current image of animals really convey all there is to animals?
Having rejected the caricatures reductionists have made of humans,
why take their animal caricatures at face value?
To acknowledge
human-animal continuity is not necessarily to indulge in biological
reductionism (Noske, 1989). Another obstacle to the recognition
of human-animal continuity is the fear among biologists of being
accused of anthropomorphism, the attribution of exclusively
human characteristics to animals. For their part, social scientists
have been jealously guarding what they see as the human domain
and so tend to applaud the biologists' fear of anthropomorphism.
What is currently denounced as anthropomorphism are those characterizations
which social scientists are keen to reserve for humans. In their
critique of biological determinism social scientists point an
accusing finger at anyone who credits animals with personhood.
But again, how can one know how animals differ from or are similar
to humans if one declines to ask the same questions about the
two?
There
are some courageous animal scientists who do say that animals
are more human-like and less object-like than their own science
will have us believe. However, they will often say such things
off the record or rather apologetically. This is understandable
since they are committing a sacrilege both from the perspective
of the animal sciences and from that of the human sciences.
Those scientists who have actually studied animals as participant
observers, the common anthropological approach to human societies,
reveal a tension in their writings between the accepted biological
codes and their own experiences with animal personhood. Jane
Goodall who is working with chimpanzees, Dian Fossey who lived
and died among mountain gorillas, the Douglas-Hamilton couple
and Cynthia Moss who are living and working among elephants,
all write about touching experiences with animal personhood.
Their science cannot handle these forms of animal reality and
tends to belittle or ignore them. The animal sciences are simply
not equipped to deal with those characteristics in animals which
according to the social sciences make humans human.
Faced
with the shortcomings of their own tradition a number of dissatisfied
animal scientists, such as Donna Haraway and Donald Griffin,
have called for a tentative anthropological approach to animals.
What attracts them in anthropology and particularly in its method
of participant observation is its intersubjective, nonreductionist
way of acquiring knowledge, a method contrasting strongly with
the subject-object approach applied by animal scientists in
their laboratories. Anthropologists treat the Other with respect
and are wary of ethnocentrism. Even though the Other cannot
be fully known nor understood, anthropologists have been trained
to tread upon this unknowable ground with respect rather than
with disdain.
But
all this pertains only to the human Other. It is curious
that scientists who have learned to beware of the dangers of
ethnocentrism so easily lapse into another kind of centrism
anthropocentrism. We are sadly stuck with two seemingly
unrelated images: one of humankind and one of animalkind conveyed
by two totally separate brands of science, the one typifying
humans as social subjects, the other typifying animals as biological
objects. The newly emerging discipline of human-animal relations
will find this a formidable obstacle to overcome.
Note
1.
Correspondence should be sent to Barbara Noske, Bosboom Toussaintlaan
2 boven, 1401 CC Bussum, The Netherlands. The author has a master's
degree in cultural anthropology and a doctorate in philosophy
from the University of Amsterdam. Further discussion of the
issues raised in this comment are found in her book, Humans
and other animals: Beyond the boundaries of anthropology , London:
Pluto Press, 1989.
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